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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
JEFFREY K. JOHNSON,

Case No. 20060602-CA

Defendant/Appellant.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant is awaiting trial on the charge of retaliation against a judge, a third degree
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316(1) (West 2004). In two pretrial orders,
the trial court denied defendant's motion to quash the bindover and defendant's motion in
limine to exclude evidence. Defendant petitioned for interlocutory review of both orders,
which this Court granted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (West 2004).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Denial of Motion to Quash the Bindover: Must the prosecution prove that
defendant intended for his alleged threats to assault or murder a judge to be communicated
to the judge; and, does the preliminary hearing evidence establish probable cause to support
the bindover? The determination of the elements of a crime is a question of law, that is
reviewed de novo and without deference to the trial court's raling. State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d
149,151 (UtahApp. 1997). Whether evidence supports a bindover is also a question of law,

is reviewed for correctness, but with "some deference" accorded to any subsidiary credibility
or factual findings . State v. Virgin, 2006 UT 29, \ 29, 137 P.3d 787.
2. Denial of Motion in Limine to Exclude Evidence: Has defendant established that
statements he made to his attorney, allegedly threatening to kill two judges and opposing
counsel, are privileged under rule 504, Utah Rule of Evidence; and, did defendant waive any
claim of privilege by stipulating to the admission of the statements at the preliminary
hearing? The determination of privilege is a question of law, reviewed for correctness on
appeal; but because privilege is highly fact-dependent, its existence is best determined on a
case-by-case basis. Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, \ 6, 984 P.2d 980. Waiver was not raised
below, but is now raised by the State as an alternative ground to affirm. Gardner v. Galetka,
2004UT42,t8,94P.3d263.
STATUTES. RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
At issue are Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316 (West 2004) and rules 504 and 507 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. See Addendum A for the full text of these and other provisions cited
in the argument.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 21,2005, defendant was charged in the Sixth Judicial District with two
counts of retaliation against a judge, third degree felonies, in violation of section 76-8-316(1)
(R. 6-7). See Add. A (Statute). The first count alleged that on September 13, 2005, during
a conversation with his divorce attorney, Joy Jelte, defendant threatened to kill Judge Paul
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D. Lyman (id.). The second count alleged that on September 16, 2005, during a taperecorded telephone conversation with Jelte, defendant threatened to kill Judge David L.
Mower (id.).1
Fifth Judicial District Court Judge Wallace Lee conducted a preliminary hearing in
the Sixth Judicial District (R. 31-33). The parties agreed that foundational testimony could
be admitted by proffer. The proffer was that a detective was contacted by Jelte and provided
a written summary of four conversations Jelte had with defendant and a tape-recording of one
of those conversations (R252: 9-11). After the proffer was made and accepted, defendant
stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 1, Jelte's written summary of threats she heard
defendant make on June 27 and September 13, 16, and 19,2005, to assault or murder Doug
Neeley, the opposing counsel in defendant's divorce case, and to assault or murder Judges
Paul Lyman and David Mower, who had made rulings in the divorce action (R252: 10-13).
See Addendum B (Exhibit 1). Defendant also stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 2, Jelte's
tape-recording of the September 16 telephone conversation (id.). See Addendum C (Official
Transcript of Exhibit 2). Defendant did not claim that Exhibits 1 and 2 contained privileged
information which was inadmissible. To the contrary, he asked the magistrate to fully
consider the contents of the exhibits in ruling on defendant's motions to dismiss Count I and
for change of venue (R. 36-50, 55-59; R252: 1-13).

]

This is an interlocutory appeal. Defendant, therefore, is presumed innocent and
any "facts" are simply allegations. The State will not continue to add "alleged" in this
brief, but recognizes that its factual assertions are unproved.
3

On December 7, 2005, Judge Lee granted defendant's motion to dismiss Count I
because the preliminary hearing evidence established that the threat to assault or murder
Judge Lyman occurred on September 16, and not September 13, as charged (R. 61-66).2
Judge Lee bound defendant over on Count II, charging defendant with retaliation against
Judge Mower (R. 63, 99).
The magistrate concluded that section 76-8-316(1), the statute under which defendant
was charged, has three elements: (1) a defendant (2) threatens to assault or murder a judge
(3) with the intent to either impede, intimidate or interfere with the judge while engaged in
the performance of the judge's official duties, or with the intent to retaliate against the judge
on account of those official duties (R. 63). The magistrate rejected defendant's argument that
section 76-8-316 has a fourth element, that is, proof that the defendant intended for the threat
to be communicated to the judge (R. 62).
The magistrate granted defendant's motion for change of venue to Salt Lake County
(R. 64). In the Third Judicial District, defendant moved to quash the bindover of Count II
(R. 119). Defendant again claimed that section 76-8-316 has a fourth element, but also
argued that an "intent to impede, influence, intimidate, or retaliate" necessarily requires proof

2

The State has since moved to amend the information to allege September 16 (R.
135-36, 143-45). That motion is pending in the trial court.
4

that he intended for Judge Mower to learn of the threats (R. 125-28,162-68). Judge Stephen
Henriod denied the motion to quash (R. 229).3 See Addendum D (Ruling).
Defendant also moved in limine to exclude "privileged statements Defendant is
alleged to have made to his attorney, Joy Jelte" (R. 147-50,218-223). Defendant argued that
Jelte's written summary of conversations (Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 1), Jelte's taperecording of one conversation (Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 2), and any testimony by Jelte
concerning the threats should all be excluded from admission at trial because the
conversations fell within the attorney-client privilege, rule 504, Utah Rules of Evidence (id.).
See Add. A (Rule). The State responded that the threats did not fall within the privilege rule
and then, as part of the motion in limine hearing, called Jelte to testify to the circumstances
surrounding the taping of the September 16 telephone conversation (R. 179-82; R253: 1218). Judge Henriod ruled that defendant's statements to Jelte were not privileged and denied
defendant's motion to exclude them from trial (R. 224-27). See Addendum E (Memorandum
Decision).

3

The ruling is minimal. The court rejected the existence of a fourth element and,
apparently, viewed defendant's claim of lack of intent as a factual issue for the jury (R.
229). The brevity of the formal order derives from the judge's handwritten comment
made as a minute entry, that indicated that the motion was denied and directed the
prosecutor to prepare a formal order (R. 146). No formal order was prepared, however,
until defendant petitioned for interlocutory review some months later. At that time, a
summary formal order-parroting the handwritten comment—was entered (R. 229). In
any case, what constitutes the elements of an offense is legal question, decided de novo
onappeal. Fixel, 945 P.2d at 151.
5

Defendant timely petitioned for and was granted interlocutory review of the denial of
the motion to quash and the denial of the motion in limine (R. 236).
STATEMENT OF FACTS4
Defendant told Joy Jelte, his long-time divorce attorney, that he had "given up on the
legal system" and that he now intended to "work outside the law" (R. 4). He was threatening
to assault or murder opposing counsel and the judges involved in his divorce case (id.), but
was he serious? Jelte was not sure, but she found his comments "very, very troubling"
(R253: 15).
Jelte had represented defendant in his first divorce in 1996 (R253: 13-14). For the
past three years, since December 2002, she had represented him in his second divorce (R254:
14). She viewed defendant not just as a client, but also as a friend (R254: 24). But she was
now "very concerned about what he was communicating to her" (R253: 15).
Defendant's second divorce trial ended in March 2005 (R253:14). Opposing counsel,
Doug Neeley, had prepared proposed findings and a decree (R253: 16). In June 2005,
defendant told Jelte that the real problem in the divorce was "leaving [Neeley] alive" (R. 4).
Jelte had filed objections to Neeley's proposed findings and a hearing was set for
Monday, September 19,2005, before Judge Mower (R253:16). On September 13,2005, the
Tuesday before the hearing, defendant, who now lived in New Mexico, telephoned Jelte (R.

4

The alleged facts are taken from Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 1 (R. 1-5) and
Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 2 (R. 254: 2-24), copies of which attached in Addenda B &
C, respectively.
6

4). He again told her that Neeley 's "life will end" and then opined that Judges Paul Lyman
and David Mower, judges in the divorce action, were "right up there" with Neeley (id.). Jelte
tried to clarify what defendant meant and asked if he planned "to kill, shoot or bomb
someone" (id.). Defendant would not tell her, but volunteered that he did not care "if he was
caught" or if he went to prison (id.). He told her that he wanted "justice," but insisted
"justice" could only happen "outside the law" (id.).
Jelte had been an attorney for 17 years and had handled many family and domestic
cases, but found defendant's comments usual (R253: 13, 15). Although defendant lived in
New Mexico, he planned on returning to Utah for the September 19 hearing. Jelte decided
that she would telephone defendant in New Mexico on September 16, the Friday before the
Monday hearing, and tape-record the call to make sure she was "hearing him correctly and
clearly" (R253: 14-15). If defendant repeated his earlier threats, she "would have the
opportunity to ponder and think about the appropriate course of action to take" (id.).
She called defendant Friday night (R253:14). She told him that she needed to discuss
his concerns regarding the proposed findings before Monday, but wanted to first review a
transcript and the case file (R254: 2 & 4). She explained that she would call him back on
Sunday once she was "up to speed" and they would then discuss specifics (R253: 17; R254:
2&4). 5

5

The official transcript (R. 254) has no page 3; however, it does not appear that any
part of the conversation is omitted.
7

She then asked him if he was feeling any better emotionally and if he had enjoyed a
recent visit with his son (R253: 5; R254: 4-6). Defendant volunteered, "I think the Court
system in Utah is screwed up" (R254: 6). He then renewed his tirade against the court
system, including Judges Mower and Lyman and attorney Neeley.
Defendant threatened that because Neeley "took away my kids. I'll take away his
kids" (R254: 14). But this could be avoided, if Neeley paid him $150,000 that defendant
believed was unfairly taken from him in the divorce (R254:16). Defendant realized that was
"not going to happen. So there's just life, liberty and justice for all" (id.). Defendant was
"tired of being "f—ked with... tired of it" (id.). And it was not just Neeley. Defendant felt
Judge Lyman was "an asshole" and "a piece of shit" (R254: 8).
Defendant was also upset with Judge Mower, whom defendant called "a slime ball
. . . a liar . .. unethical... a hypocrite" (R254: 6). Defendant said Judge Mower was "the
one that signed the protective order for [defendant's wife] to go remove everything except
for my personal shaving articles, and steel. He won't give them back. So I think he can
make up for that" (R254: 15).
Defendant told Jelte that he had "no faith in the Court system . . . no faith in it at all.
The only way it's ever going to be fair is when people make it fair" (R254: 7). He believed
that if he wanted "justice," he needed to "handle it by myself (R254: 9, 16). He just was
"not going to take it no more," he had "had it" (R254: 9). He warned, "After one, the rest
are free" (id.).

8

Defendant realized that "they" could put him "in jail for 60 days... for a year... and
all it's going to do is piss [him] off more. They [could] take away [his] guns, and all it's
going to do is piss [him] off more" (R254: 9-10). When Jelte reminded defendant of the
effect his threatened actions would have on his children, defendant said he did not care; he
did not plan on seeing them again (R254: 10). Jelte questioned whether defendant was
suicidal. Defendant denied that he was, but said he might be later but, "[o]nly after I take out
a bunch of people with me. I'm not going to go by myself. I can guarantee it" (R254: 10).
He wanted to "[g]o out with a bang" (R254: 17). He again told Jelte that even if "they catch
up with me, after one, the rest are free. Yep, I'll make my mark" (id.).
Defendant opined that if more people felt like he did, the court system would change
for the better: "If 20 years ago, if 5 years ago, if 10 years ago men would stand up and say,
'You know what? I'm tired of being screwed by Utah,' and take action on their own, maybe
somebody would say, 'You know what? Maybe this isn't right. We're getting Judges
knocked off left and right. Maybe this isn't right'" (R254: 11).
Defendant told Jelte that he knew what he needed to do: "If I can get four or five
people in Sanpete and Sevier County and they take me out, it's a better world isn't it? . . .
And if I can take out their DNA offspring, it's even better " (R254: 12). Jelte warned
defendant "all you're going to do is break your parents' heart and devastate your children"
(id.). She told him, "You're too good a man for that. You're upset right now" (id.).
Defendant disagreed. He said, "I've been upset for years. I'm past upset. I want justice"

9

(id.). Jelte continued to try to dissuade him from taking any action (R254: 12-13).
Defendant then volunteered, "You know what? I told my buddy about it. I've got a
pretty close friend, and he told me - he said, 'You're know what, you're not going to get
caught, but you're going to go to hell" (R 254: 13). Defendant told him, "It's worth it" (id.).
When Jelte asked three times who the friend was, defendant replied, "Nobody. Nobody else
needs to be in this" (R254: 13-14). Jelte probed for specifics of what defendant was
planning, but he refused to tell her: "I don't think I'll tell you, you know. It won't benefit
you, and I know it won't benefit me if I tell you" (R254: 15).
Jelte encouraged defendant to seek psychological counseling, but he refused (id.). He
told her, "There's no need to worry, Joy. My mind is made up. I'm not suicidal. I'm not.
I have a really good life down here [in New Mexico]. I have fun all the time, you know. It's
just you know what? There will be justice" (R254: 20).
Defendant explained that the judges in his case had hurt him by refusing to follow the
law (R254: 22). Defendant warned Jelte that as far as he was concerned, it is an "equal
playing field": "[wjhat's fair for the goose is good for the gander. I'll play by their rules [but
if] they refuse to follow the law, so be it" (R254: 22-23). Defendant continued to argue with
Jelte. He insisted that he was not being "stupid," but "talking justice. I'm talking principle
. .. what's just is just" (R254: 23). He said, "If I leave it alone, things are just going to go
on as usual. It's just going to keep happening to somebody else. Judges refuse to follow the
law, and attorney-yep. You know what? It's got to end sometime" (R254: 24).

10

Jelte

pleaded with defendant to think about what he was threatening. She told him: "I'm sincere
as your friend, as your lawyer, as a friend to your parents, as a friend even to your kids, I
really want you to snap out of it, Jeff, You know better" (R254: 24,21). Defendant replied,
"Well, I don't have anything planned in the near future" (id.). The tape then ran out (id.).
Three days later, on Monday, September 19, 2005, defendant appeared in Judge
Mower's courtroom for the scheduled hearing (R. 5). Defendant "confronted Doug Neeley"
in the courtroom and demanded that the attorney pay him back $150,000 (id.). Law
enforcement officers observed the encounter and defendant's "agitated state" (R. 1-2). As
Jelte left the courtroom with defendant, he turned to her and said, "that asshole is going to
die and all of his family" (R. 5).
Jelte contacted the police and provided them with a written summary of defendant's
threats from June through September (Preliminary Hearing Exhibit 1) and a tape-recording
of her telephone conversation with defendant on the previous Friday (Preliminary Hearing
Exhibit 2). Defendant was immediately arrested (R. 2, 6-7).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Denial of Motion to Quash: The bindover in this case was proper because probable
cause established the three requisite elements of section 76-8-316(1): (1) defendant (2)
threatened to assault or murder Judge Mower (3) with the intent to retaliate against the judge
on account of his official actions in defendant's divorce case. Contrary to defendant's
assertions, it is not necessary to also prove that he intended for the judge to learn of the
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threats. Indeed, courts which have addressed the question—including those cited by
defendant—have not interpreted the phrase "with the intent to retaliate" as requiring proof
that the judge learn of the threat or proof that the defendant expected and wanted the judge
to learn of the threat. Instead, as in this case, communication of the threat to a third party is
sufficient. Consequently, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to quash the
bindover.
Denial of Motion in Limine: Not all statements made by a client to an attorney are
privileged. Instead, the attorney-client privilege, set out in rule 504, Utah Rules of Evidence,
protects only "confidential communications"—those communications not intended to be
disclosed to third parties—which are made "for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services." In this case, defendant's statements to his attorney that he
intended to assault or murder two judges and opposing counsel are not privileged. The
statements were never confidential because defendant had previously made the same
statements to a third-party, "his buddy," before repeating the statements to his attorney. The
statements were also not made to facilitate the obtaining of legal advice or other legitimate
legal services. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion in limine to
exclude their admission at trial.
Alternatively, defendant waived his right to claim privilege. Rule 507, Utah Rules of
Evidence, recognizes that the holder of a privilege waives his right to assert the privilege
when he "consents to the disclosure" of the privileged information. Here, it is undisputed
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that defendant stipulated at the preliminary hearing to the admission of Exhibits 1 and 2, both
of which reveal significant, if not all, portions of the information he now claims is privileged.
Because defendant failed to assert the privilege at preliminary hearing, he is precluded from
reasserting it at trial Consequently, this Court may affirm the denial of the motion in limine
on this alternative ground, which is apparent in the record, without determining if
defendant's threats were actually privileged.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
SECTION 76-8-316(1) DOES NOT REQUIRE PROOF THAT
DEFENDANT INTENDED FOR HIS THREATS TO BE
COMMUNICATED TO THE JUDGE; AND, IN ANY CASE, THE
PRELIMINARY HEARING EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE BINDOVER
Defendant was charged with retaliation against a judge, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 76-8-316(1) (West 2004). That provision reads:
A person is guilty of a third degree felony if the person threatens to assault,
kidnap, or murder a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole
with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge or a member
of the board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or member's
official duties or with the intent to retaliate against the judge or member on
account of the performance of those official duties.
See Add. A for complete text. In this case, the information alleges that defendant threatened
to assault or murder Judge Mower with the intent to retaliate against the judge on account of
the judge's official actions in defendant's divorce case (R. 6-7). The other variation of the
crime—threatening to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge with the intent to impede,
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intimidate, or interfere with the judge while engaged in the performance of his duties—is not
charged and is not at issue.6
Defendant asserts that insufficient evidence supports the bindover because the
prosecution failed to prove that he intended "to influence a judge with the threat." See Brief
of Appellant [Br.Aplt. ] at 1, 8,11 -12. According to defendant, "a person cannot utter a threat
with the intent or expectation that the threat will influence or punish the judge if there is no
foreseeable way for the judge to learn of the threat." Id. at 9-10. Defendant argues that the
preliminary hearing evidence here did not establish that he instructed Jelte to tell the judge
of his threats or that Jelte told defendant she would report the threats.

Id. at 11.

Consequently, he claims it was error to deny his motion to quash the bindover. Id. at 12-17.
Defendant is incorrect. As a matter of law, the prosecution is not required to prove
that defendant intended the threat to be communicated to the judge. Moreover, the
preliminary hearing evidence establishes probable cause to support all elements of the crime.
This Court has previously determined that section 76-8-316(1) has only three
elements. As applied here, those elements are: (1) defendant (2) threatened to assault or

6

Below, defendant argued that the two intent variants could not be "split" and that
whatever was required by one must be required by the other (R253: 11). On appeal,
defendant continues to treat the two intents as one. See Brief of Appellant [Br.Aplt.] at 812. But the statute's plain language and use of a disjunctive establish their differences.
Cf. State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 152 (Utah App. 1997) (distinguishing between the two
variants and recognizing that the first variant encompasses intimidating a judge to grant
more favorable rulings in the future, while the second variant proscribes threatening to
assault or otherwise harm a judge because of a past ruling).
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murder Judge Mower (3) with the intent to retaliate against the judge on account of the
judge's past rulings in defendant's divorce case. See State v. Fixel, 945 P.2d 149, 150 n.l
& 152 (finding a jury instruction setting out similar elements as "beyond reproach").
In moving to quash the bindover order, defendant argued that Fixel imposed a fourth
element: "(4) and the Defendant reasonably expected that the judge would learn of the threat"
(R. 126). Alternatively, defendant argued that such proof was "logically" required by the
plain language of the third statutory element, intent to retaliate (R. 126-27, 163). The trial
court denied the motion (R. 146, 229).
On appeal, defendant no longer claims that Fixel imposes a separate fourth element.
See Br.Aplt. at 7-12. Instead, he claims only that the third element-intent to retaliate-cannot
be established without proof that defendant intended for the judge to learn of his threats. See
Br.Aplt. at 9-11. He also claims that the preliminary hearing evidence does not establish his
intent for the threats to be communicated to the judge. See Br.Aplt. at 12-17. Neither the
plain language of the statute nor cases interpreting the same or similarly-worded statutes
support defendant's legal and factual claims.
A.

The Preliminary Hearing Evidence Establishes Probable Cause of the
First and Second Elements, that is, that Defendant Threatened to
Assault and Murder Judge Mower.

Defendant concedes that he threatened to assault or murder Judge Mower. See
Br.Aplt. at 13. But an examination of the requirements of the second statutory element—
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threatening to assault or murder a judge—clarifies what is required by the third element of
"with the intent to retaliate."
A "threat" is "an expression of an intention to inflict evil, injury, or damage on
another." See United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)
(citation and quotation marks omitted). Section 76-8-316(1) limits its application to threats
to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge or other designated official, but does not require that
the threat be "real." Fbcel, 945 P.2d at 152. A credible "bluff to assault, kidnap, or murder
is sufficient. See id. Consequently, section 76-8-316(1) requires no proof of a defendant's
actual intention to carry out the threatened action. Id. at 151-52 & n.5. Nor does it require
proof of "an intent to take action in that general direction." Id. at 151-52.
As this Court recognized in Fixel, 945 P.2d at 152 n.5, section 76-8-316(1) is "nearly
identicafto 18U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B), and, consequently, cases interpreting section 115 and
other similarly-worded statutes provide appropriate guidance. The federal statute reads:
Whoever threatens to assault, kidnap, murder . . . a United States judge . . .
with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such... judge... while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or with the intent to retaliate
against such . . . judge . . . on account of the performance of official duties,
shall be punished.
See Add. A for complete text of section 115. Universally, federal courts recognize that an
objective standard governs what constitutes a threat to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge:
Alleged threats should be considered in light of their entire factual context,
including the surrounding events and reaction of the listeners... . Whether a
particular statement may properly be considered to be a threat is governed by
an objective standard—whether a reasonable person would foresee that the
16

statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the
statement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.
Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 1265. See also United States v. Saunders, 166 F.3d 907,912
& 914 n.5 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing First, Second, Fourth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits as
applying objective test). Some federal courts describe the objective standard slightly
differently: Whether a "reasonable recipient," familiar with the contents and context of the
communication would interpret the statement as a threat. See United States v. Roberts, 915
F.2d 889, 891 (4th Cir. 1990), cert, denied, 498 U.S. 1122 (1991); United States v. Raymer,
876F.2d383,391 (5th Cir.), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 870(1989). See also Sanders, 166F.3d
at 913 n.6 (recognizing two objective tests applied by circuits). But there appears to be little
qualitative difference between the two standards. Compare Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at
1265, with Roberts, 915 F.2d at 890-91 (both recognizing issue is a jury question determined
by the totality of the factual circumstances, including the context of the statement, its
specificity, the manner in which the threat was made, and the reaction of the listener).
Accord Fixel, 945 P.2d at 152 n.5 (citing with approval objective standards in both Roberts
and Orozco-Santillan). See also State v. Spainhower, 1999 UT App 280, \ 12,988 P.2d 452
(in context of different statute, recognizing that objective standard applies in determining
what constitutes a threat).
By requiring the threat to be a "true threat," an objectively credible threat, statutes like
sections 76-8-316(1) and 115(a)(1)(B) ensure that they do not punish protected speech under
the First Amendment. See Roberts, 915 F.2d at 890 (citing Watts v. United States, 394 U.S.
17

705, 708 (1969)). Statements that objectively constitute political protest or hyperbole or
mere jokes do not fall within the statutes' purview. See Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at 126566\ Roberts, 9\5¥2&dLt%90.
Nevertheless, as recognized in Fixel and other cases, more is required for conviction
than a general intent to threaten to injure a judge. The defendant must also communicate the
threat to someone. See United States v. Hinkson, 349 F. Supp.2d 1350, 1355 (D. Idaho
2004). Whether communication of a threat has occurred normally arises in the context of the
second element, whether a "true threat" was made. See, e.g.9 Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d at
1265; Roberts, 915 F.2d at 891. Universally, courts recognize that an un-communicated
threat to injure a judge is not criminally punishable because it is nothing more than an
unexpressed and presumptively un-acted upon thought. See 31A Am. Jur. 2d Extortion,
Blackmail, and Threats § 54 (May 2006).
On the other hand, as defendant conceded below (R253: 7), section 76-8-316(1) and
similarly-worded statutes do not require that a threat to injure a judge actually be
communicated to the judge. See United States v. Stewart, 420 F.3d 1007, 1015-16 (9th Cir.
2005); United States v. Martin, 163 F.3d 1212, 1216 (10th Cir. 1998), cert denied, 526 U.S.
U31 (\999)\Raymer,%16¥2&zX?>9\\D'Amariov.

United States, 403 F.Supp.2d 361,318

(D. N.J. 2005) (all recognizing that section 115(a)(1)(B) does not require that a threat to
injure a judge be actually communicated to the judge).
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Instead, it is well-recognized that a threat to injure a judge or other designated official
communicated to any third-party is sufficient to violate section 115(a)( 1 )(B) and statutes like
section 76-8-316(1). See Martin, 163 F.3d at 1213 & 1216 (affirming a section 115
conviction where the threat to kill an officer was made to a friend, who, unbeknownst to
Martin, was a police informant); Roberts, 915 F.2d at 890-91 (affirming a section 115
conviction based on letter sent to Justice O'Connor threatening to kill Justices Brennan,
Stevens, and Kennedy); D'Amario, 403 F. Supp.2d at 366 (refusing to vacate a section 115
conviction based on D'Amario's letter to his attorney threatening to murder judges once he
was released from prison); Austad v. South Dakota Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 719 N.W.2d
760, 763 & 765 (S.D. 2006) (concluding that threats to kill a probation officer made to
Austad's mental health worker were "true threats" and punishable); State v. McCarthy, 101
P.3d 288,292 & 299 (Mont. 2004) (affirming a state intimidation conviction where the threat
to kill the district attorney was made in a telephone call between McCarthy and his probation
officer); State v. Thompson, 580 S.E.2d 9,638 & 644-46 (N.C. App. 2003) (affirming a state
communication of threats conviction where a threat to kill police officers and others was
made by Thompson to an acquaintance on a beach); State v. Warsop, 954 P.2d 748, 684-85
(N.M. App.) (affirming a state retaliation against a witness conviction where the threat to kill
a rape victim was made by Warsop to a prison correctional officer), cert, denied, 124 N.M.
589 (N.M. 1998); State v. Jones, 642 So.2d 804, 805 (Fla. App. 1994) (reversing the
dismissal of information charging retaliation against a witness because prima facie evidence
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established that Jones told his probation that he intended to kill police officers); State v.
Hansen, 862P.2d 117,714-15 716-17 (Wash. 1993) (en banc) (affirming a state intimidating
a judge conviction where the threat against a judge was made to an attorney whom Hansen
was trying to retain).
The only question here, then, is whether the preliminary hearing evidence is sufficient
show probable cause that defendant acted with the intent to retaliate.
B.

The Preliminary Hearing Evidence Establishes Probable Cause of the
Third Element, that Defendant Acted with the Intent to Retaliate
against Judge Mower on Account of the Judge's Prior Rulings in
Defendant's Divorce Case.

Although defendant acknowledges that communication of a threat to a third party is
sufficient, Br.Aplt. at 8-12, he argues that it is sufficient only if a defendant actually intends
for the third party to convey the threat to the judge. In other words, defendant contends that
while he need not communicate his threats to the judge, he must at least intend or foresee that
the threats may be conveyed to the judge. Defendant explains that this intent is proved if a
defendant tells the third party to convey the threat to the targeted judge or if the third party
informs the defendant that he or she will convey the threat to the judge. See Br.Aplt. at 11
& 15-16. Defendant's argument suffers from two flaws.
First, it assumes that a threat to retaliate (pay back) a judge has no meaning unless
the judge learns of the threat. See Br.Aplt. at 11. Consequently, defendant argues that the
plain language of section 76-8-316(1) requires proof that he intended the judge to learn of
the threat, even if the judge does not actually learn of it. See Br.Aplt. at 9-12.
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Second, it incorrectly assumes that "with the intent to retaliate" modifies only "threat"
and not the threatened action of assault, kidnap, or murder. In other words, according to
defendant, the threat alone must be intended as retaliation for some past action. In some
cases, such as when the threat is a mere bluff, this may be true. See Fixel, 945 P.2d at 152
(recognizing that a defendant may simply wish to pay back a judge by upsetting him, as
opposed to causing him real harm). It is not true, however, when the threat to injure is real.
When a defendant threatens to actually injure a judge, the phrase "with the intent to retaliate"
necessarily also modifies the intended action—assault, kidnap, or murder.

In such

circumstances, the injury itself is intended as retaliation for some past action of the judge,
not merely the threat.
The purposes underlying threat statutes support this reading of section 76-8-316(1).
Those well-recognized purposes include: preventing actual injury to an individual judge;
minimizing inconvenience to and disruption of government function caused by threats,
whether real or bluff; guaranteeing that judicial decisions are made without fear of reprisal
or adverse consequence; and demanding respect for the judiciary even when a party or the
public disagree with a decision. See Rogers v. United States, 422 U.S. 35, 47-48 (1975)
(Marshall, J., concurring) (in context of threats against the president); United States v.
Fuller, 387 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2004); United States v. Richards, 415 F. Supp.2d 547,
553-54 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (same). Therefore, the plain language of section 76-8-316(1), read
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in light of these purposes, necessarily requires that "with the intent to retaliate" modify both
the threat and the threatened act.
Moreover, the overwhelming majority of cases to interpret this language reject
defendant's assertion that he must intend for the threat to reach the judge. See cases, supra,
at 18-19. This is because, as previously discussed, sections 78-8-316(1) and 115(a)(1)(B)
proscribe only "true threats," i.e., credible threats to harm, whether real or bluff. Because
the determination of what constitutes a "true threat" requires placing a threat in context, the
majority of courts view "with the intent to retaliate" as explaining the motive for the threat
or threatened action. See supra at 16-17.
Under this general intent/motivation approach, affirmative defenses such as mental
illness or intoxication are deemed irrelevant. A small number of courts disagree that such
defenses should be excluded. These courts view "with intent to retaliate" as a specific intent
and, thereby, permit introduction of any evidence disproving that intent. See, e.g., United
States v. Veach, 455 F.3d 628,632 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing specific intent); United States
v. Stewart, 420 F.3d at 1017-19 (recognizing and applying both general intent and specific
intent approaches). Fixe/may follow this specific intent approach. 945 P.2d at 151 (noting,
"It is not enough that a threat is uttered. It has to be uttered with a specified intent."). But
whether "intent to retaliate" is a description of motivation or a specific intent, proof of it may
still be established by reasonable inferences drawn from both the content and the context of
a threat. See Stewart, 420 F.3d at 1017-19. Cf. Fixel, 945P.2dat 152. Accordingly, when
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as here, the threat to assault or murder is expressly conditioned upon an intent to retaliate,
specific intent is established.
Aside from Fixel, defendant cites but one case to support his argument that evidence
must establish his intent to communicate the threat to the judge. See BrAplt at 11 (citing
United States v. Fenton, 30 F. Supp.2d 520 (W.D. Pa. 1998)). Defendant's reliance on
Fenton is misplaced. In any case, it stands nearly alone.
In Fenton, the district court held that a threat to kill a senator made to an insurance
adjuster did not violate section 115(a)(1)(B). 30 F. Supp.2d at 522-24. The district judge
based his decision on two grounds: (1) Fenton's statement was not objectively threatening,
and (2) the threat was not a "true threat" because there was no connection between the
insurance adjuster and the senator. Id. at 523-25 & n.5 (citing United States v. Bellrichard,
779 F.2d454 (D. Minn. 1991), aff'd994 F.2d 1318 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 510 U.S. 928
(1993)). Bellrichard, however, only requires that a foreseeable, not actual, connection exits.
779 F.2d at 460. Fenton's approach is contrary to the majority view and inconsistent with
the purposes of threat statutes. SeeHinkson, 349 F. Supp.2d at 1355-57. But even ifFenton
were applied here, the evidence supports that a foreseeable connection exists: Jelte was an
officer of the court and was appearing before Judge Mower in defendant's divorce case.
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In sum, defendant's argument that the preliminary hearing evidence was insufficient
is neither legally or factually supportable.7 Accordingly, defendant's motion to quash the
bindover was properly denied. See State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, | 15, 26 P.3d 223
(recognizing that evidence is sufficient to support a bindover when is establishes "a
reasonable belief that defendant engaged in the charged conduct) (citation and quotation
marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
POINT II
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS TO JELTE THAT HE INTENDED TO
KILL TWO JUDGES AND OPPOSING COUNSEL ARE NOT
PRIVILEGED; IN ANY CASE, DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CLAIM
OF PRIVILEGE WHEN HE STIPULATED TO THE ADMISSION OF
THE STATEMENTS IN PRELIMINARY HEARING
At preliminary hearing, defendant stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 1, Jelte's
written summary of threats he made in his conversations with her in June and September,
2005 (R252: 9-12). He also stipulated to the admission of Exhibit 2, the tape recording of
the September 16 conversation between defendant and Jelte (id.). At the preliminary
hearing, he did not assert that either exhibit contained inadmissible privileged information.
Nor did he otherwise claim that the preliminary hearing magistrate could not fully consider

7

A comparison of the State's Statement of Facts, supra at 6-11, and defendant's
factual summary and assertions, Br.Aplt at 4-5 & 12-15, demonstrates that defendant has
failed to properly marshaled the facts. Though he recites the threats made, he does not
place them in context nor acknowledge all of the surrounding circumstances. This Court
may, therefore, summarily refuse to consider the merits of his claim. See United Park
City v. Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35,ffif25-27, 140 P.3d 1200.
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the information contained in the exhibits. To the contrary, he encouraged the magistrate to
review both exhibits before ruling on defendant's motions to dismiss Count I and for change
of venue (R252: 12-13).
Subsequently, defendant disclosed the contents of his conversations with his attorney
when he moved to quash the bindover order and extensively quoted from Exhibit 2 in his
memorandum (R. 120-34). When he did, he did not assert that the information was
privileged or otherwise attempt to minimize its disclosure (id). Moreover, at various points
in the proceedings below, he agreed that he had stipulated to the disclosure of the information
contained in Exhibits 1 and 2 (R. 36, 120-24; R253: 24).
Despite these prior voluntary disclosures, defendant eventually moved for an in limine
ruling "preventing the [S]tate from admitting into evidence [at trial] any privileged
statements Defendant is alleged to have made to his Attorney, Joy Jelte" (R. 147).
Defendant argued that any statements he made to Jelte, including his threats to assault or
murder Judges Mower and Lyman and attorney Neeley, fell within the attorney-client
privilege rule and were barred from admission at trial (R. 147-50, 218-22). See Utah R.
Evid. 504 (attorney-client privilege rule) (Add. A). This included Exhibits 1 and 2 and any
testimony from Jelte concerning those conversations (id.). See also R253: 20-22.
The prosecutor responded that the threats did not fall within the privilege rule, which
protected only "confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the
rendition of professional legal services" (R. 178-82). See Utah. R. Evid. 504(b). The
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prosecutor argued that the threats were not confidential because defendant disclosed the same
information to a third party (id.). See Utah R, Evid. 504(a)(6). Nor were the threats made
to obtain legal advice (id.). See also R253: 22.
The trial court correctly found no privilege because the threats were not
communicated to Jelte to obtain legal advice (R. 224-27) (Add. E)} This Court should
likewise conclude no privilege exists. Alternatively, this Court may affirm on the ground that
whether privilege exists or not, defendant waived his right to assert the privilege at trial when
he consented to the disclosure of the statements at preliminary hearing.
A.

Defendant's Threats Made to His Attorney Are Not Privileged
Because the Statements Were Not Confidential and Not Made to
Obtain Legal Advice.

An attorney, as an officer of the court and to prevent harm to another, may ethically
disclose a client's threat to assault or murder a judge or opposing counsel. See Utah R. Prof.
Conduct, Preamble (attorney's pledge to act as an officer of the courts) & Rule 1.6(b)
(recognizing that a lawyer has the discretion to breach confidentiality to prevent "reasonably
certain death or substantial bodily harm") (Add. A). Here, Jelte's disclosure to the police of
defendant's threats was ethically appropriate (R. 224).9
8

The trial court did not address confidentiality (R. 224-27).

9

In a footnote, defendant asserts that Jelte's disclosure was not ethically
permissible because defendant told her that he did not "have anything planned for the
near future." See BrAplt. at 18-19 n.5 & R254: 24. Defendant's actions at the Monday
hearing indicate otherwise. At the hearing, defendant appeared agitated, confronted
attorney Neeley, demanded that Neeley pay him $150,000 (as defendant told Jelte he
would on Friday), and after Neeley refused, defendant told Jelte, "that asshole is going to
26

Nevertheless, while an attorney may ethically disclose confidential information to
prevent physical harm, the disclosed information may nevertheless be barred pursuant to
evidentiary rule. See Burns v. Boyden, 2006 UT 14, f 15 n.4,133 P.3d 370 (noting without
deciding that obligatory reporting statutes "may not constitute complete exceptions to the
privilege rules," which may bar testimony, citing Edward L. Kimball & Ronald N. Boyce,
Utah Evidence Law, at 5-159 n.89 (2d ed. 2004)).
Utah's attorney-client privilege is found in rule 504(b), Utah Rules of Evidence,
which states: "A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person
from disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the
rendition of professional legal services." See Add. A for complete text. The rule defines a
communication as "confidential if not intended to be disclosed to third persons." See Utah
R. Evid. 504(a)(6) {Add. A). As the rule makes clear, "the mere existence of an attorneyclient relationship 'does not ipso facto make all communications between them
confidential.'" GoldStandardy Inc. v. American BarrickResources Corp., 801 P.2d 909,
911 (Utah 1990). Rather, the privilege "protects only those disclosures—necessary to obtain
informed legal advice—which might not have been made absent the privilege." Id. (citation
and quotation marks omitted). By promoting "full and frank communication between

die and all of his family" (R. 5) {Add. B). These actions reasonably increased the
probability that defendant intended to actually harm Neeley and, in turn, the judges.
Contrary to defendant's assertion, the ethical rules do not require that the threat of harm
be imminent; instead, the standard is reasonableness. See Utah R. Prof. Conduct 1.0 &
\.6{b) {Add A).
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attorneys and their clients," the privilege promotes "broader public interests in the
observance of law and administration of justice." Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S.
383, 389 (1981). Moreover, "[s]ince the privilege has the effect of withholding relevant
information from the fact-finder, it applies only where necessary to achieve its purpose."
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
The party asserting privilege has the burden to show the communication qualifies for
protection under rule 504. See Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 495 P.2d 1254, 1257
(Utah 1972). Though privilege is a legal determination, it is highly fact-dependent and best
determined on an individual basis. Doe v. Maret, 1999 UT 74, \ 6, 984 P.2d 980; Gold
Standard, Inc., 801 P.2d at 911. Because the trial court found no privilege existed here,
defendant is obligated to marshal the facts and show why the trial court decision is wrong.
United Park City Mines Co., 2006 UT 35, \ 26. Defendant has not met his marshaling
burden.
Instead, defendant merely summarizes the facts to support his assertion that the threats
he communicated to Jelte are protected by the privilege. See Br.Aplt at 22-24. Defendant
claims that the threats were "made intermittently in the course of a protracted discussion of
his protracted divorce." Br.Aplt. at 23. He claims that in the September 16 conversation, the
two legitimately discussed defendant's "child support and visitation, the property division,
the protective order, whether he would exercise his right to appeal, whether he could afford
to pay attorney fees for an appeal, potential reconciliation with his wife, the proper attorney's
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fees for her lawyer, whether the lawyers and judges in his case were following the law,
whether there was perjury, ex parte contact with a judge or unethical conduct involved in the
case, how justice should be administered, and what the potential consequences were to him
if he hurt someone." Br.Aplt at 23-24. Exhibit 2 negates these claims: there was no
legitimate discussion of these issues, but for Jelte's initial statements that she could not
discuss the divorce issues because she was not "up to speed" and would call defendant on
Sunday (R254:2 & 4; R253:15,17). After this, the remainder of the conversation consisted
of defendant's tirades against the judges, opposing counsel, his wife, and the judicial system
(R254: 5-24) (Add. Q . These tirades were not simply "heated frustration" as characterized
by defendant, Br.Aplt. at 24, but explicit threats to assault or murder two judges, opposing
counsel, and their families. See Statement of Facts, supra. See also Add. C.
Additionally, defendant improperly claims that Jelte "wished" defendant to repeat the
threats she had previously heard on June 27 and September 13 and wanted "to set up
[defendant] to make inflammatory statements on the tape." Br.Aplt. at 22-23. Again, review
of Exhibit 2 and Jelte's hearing testimony (R253: 15) negates defendant's claims.
When the conversations related in Exhibits 1 and 2 are considered in context and their
content properly marshaled, it is clear that no privilege applies. The marshaled facts establish
that defendant did not discuss his plans to assault or kill the judges and attorney Neeley only
with his attorney. He told Jelte that he had already disclosed the same information to a thirdparty, "his buddy," who agreed with defendant that he would probably not get caught if he
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assaulted or killed the targeted individuals, but that defendant would "go to hell" (R254:1315). Consequently, the information was never confidential nor intended to be. See Utah R.
Evid. 504(6).
Additionally, when the facts are properly marshaled, they establish that defendant was
not seeking legal advice when he made the threats to Jelte. The divorce action was
completed when the threats began in June (R. 4; R253: 14). In September, only entry of
formal factual findings and a decree were pending (R253: 16). The threats to kill opposing
counsel and the judges certainly arose from the divorce case, but they had no legitimate
relevancy to the proceedings or Jelte's services. To the contrary, Jelte, both as a friend and
attorney, tried to stop defendant from making the threats. She warned him that if he was
caught, he would be jailed; but he said he did not care. See Statement of Facts, supra. She
told him he needed psychological counseling; but he refused. See id. When she sought the
name of the friend he had spoken to and more details of defendant's plans, defendant refused
and told her that "[i]t won't benefit you, and I know it won't benefit me if I tell you" (R254:
15) (Add. C). In sum, even defendant did not pretend during the conversation that he was
seeking professional legal advice or services. He was, instead, simply telling his attorney of
his intention to commit a future crime. Such statements are not privileged. See United
States v. Alexander, 287 F.3d 811, 815 & 817 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that Alexander's
threats to his attorneys to kill them, opposing counsel, and federal agents were not privileged
because the threats were not made to obtain legal advice and the attorneys could testify as
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witnesses to the threats); Aviles v. State, 165 S.W.3d 437, 339 (Texas App. 2005) (holding
that Aviles' threat to kill the prosecutor, which was heard by the translator appointed to assist
defense counsel, was not privileged because it was not made to facilitate the obtaining of
legal services); Hodgson Russ, LLP, v. Trube, 867 So.2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. App. 2004)
(holding that client's threat to kill his sister to end their legal dispute, which was made to his
attorney, was not privileged because it was not made to obtain legal advice). See also
Hansen, 862 P.2d at 121 (finding no attorney-client relationship, but recognizing that if such
a relationship existed, it would not protect "a client's remarks concerning the furtherance of
crime, fraud, or to conversations regarding the contemplation of a future crime"). But see
Purcell v. District Attorney, 676 N.E.2d 436, 440-42 (Mass. 1997) (holding that a client's
statements to his attorney that he intended to burn down an apartment building were
privileged).10
Based on defendant's failure to properly marshal the evidence, this Court should
summarily reject the merits of his claim. Even if the merits are considered, defendant has
failed to establish that his statements to Jelte were confidential or were made to facilitate the
obtaining of professional legal advice. Consequently, the trial court's refusal to exclude the
statements from trial should be affirmed.

10

Neither the State nor these cases rely on the crime-fraud exception of the
attorney-client privilege because that exception applies only when the client seeks to
obtain his attorney's help in committing a crime. See Utah R. Evid. 504(d)(1) {Add. A).
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B.

Alternatively, Defendant Waived Any Claim of Privilege.

"'It is well settled that an appellate court may affirm the judgment appealed from if
it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record, even though such
ground or theory differs from that stated by the trial court to be the basis of its ruling or
action.'" Gardner v. Galetka, 2004 UT 42, \ 8, 94 P.3d 263 (quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002
UT 58, f 10, 52 P.3d 1158) (other citation and quotation marks omitted). Here, the Court
may affirm on the alternative ground of waiver. See Doe, 1999 UT 74, ^f 5 (reaching waiver
as an alternative ground to affirm).
Because the trial court ruled that the statements to Jelte were not privileged, it did not
consider whether any privilege was waived (R. 224-27) {Add. E). However, the facts
necessary to determine waiver are evident on the record and factually undisputed.
Consequently, whether or not privilege exists, this Court may dispose of defendant's claim
on the alternative ground that he waived his right to claim privilege at trial when he
stipulated to the admission of Exhibits 1 and 2 in preliminary hearing.
Here, it is undisputed that defendant stipulated to the admission of Exhibits 1 and 2
in preliminary hearing (R. 36, 120-24; R252: 9-12; R253: 24). Exhibit 1 discloses the
substance of conversations between defendant and Jelte on June 27 and September 13, 16,
and 19. See Statement of Facts, supra. Exhibit 2 is a tape-recording of the September 16
conversation (R252:10-13). While it is true that Jelte, if called to testify at trial, might reveal
additional details of the unrecorded conversations, significant portions of the June 27 and
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September 13 and 19 conversations have already been disclosed. Moreover, the taperecording of the September 16 conversation fully reveals that conversation, including
defendant's tone and expression, but for possibly some minimal discussion towards the end
of the conversation when the tape ran out (R254: 24). In sum, the information defendant
now claims is privileged for purposes of trial has already been significantly, if not fully,
disclosed at the preliminary hearing.
Because defendant stipulated to these prior disclosures, he has waived his right to
claim that the disclosed information is privileged. Rule 507 (a), Utah Rules of Evidence,
directs that an evidentiary privilege is waived when the holder of the privilege "voluntarily
discloses or consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the matter of
communication." See Add. A. The Advisory Committee Note recognizes: "Since the
purpose of evidentiary privileges is the protection of some societal interest or confidential
relationship, the privilege should end when the purpose is no longer served because the
holder of the privilege has allowed disclosure or made disclosure." See Utah R. Evid.
507(a), Advisory Committee Note (Add. A). See also Doe, 1999 UT 74, ^ 3 (recognizing
that privilege is waived when voluntary disclosure of the information occurs in a prior
deposition); State v. Anderson, 972 P.2d 86, 89 (Utah App. 1998) (holding that Anderson
waived any claim of privilege at trial when he failed to object to the testimony at preliminary
hearing).
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Anderson involved nearly identical facts and controls the outcome here. Anderson
was charged with fraudulently obtaining controlled substances by prescription. Anderson,
972 P.2d at 87. At preliminary hearing, the prosecution called Anderson's doctors to testify.
Id. Anderson did not assert that the doctors' testimonies or their records were inadmissible
on grounds of physician-patient privilege. Id. Before trial, Anderson filed a motion in
limine to exclude the doctors' testimonies and records from trial on the ground of privilege.
Id. This Court affirmed the trial court's ruling that no privilege existed because Anderson
had not communicated confidentially with the doctors to obtain a legitimate diagnosis or
treatment. Id. at 89. Alternatively, it reversed the trial court's ruling that Anderson's failure
to assert the privilege at preliminary did not waive the privilege for trial. Id. Instead, this
Court held that "when [Anderson] failed to assert the physician-patient privilege to prevent
disclosure at preliminary hearing, he waived the privilege and could not thereafter reassert
it at trial." Id. at 90. The same holds true for defendant here.
In sum, defendant's threats were not privileged. This Court, however, need not
resolve the issue because, whether privileged or not, defendant waived his right to assert
privilege. Exhibits 1 and 2 and testimony from Joy Jelte, therefore, are not barred from trial.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's denials of
defendant's motion to quash the bindover and motion in limine to exclude evidence. The
case should be remanded to the district court to proceed to trial.
Respectfully submitted this / 9 ^ d a y of March, 2007.

MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellee
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and accurate copies of the foregoing brief of
Plaintiff/Appellee were delivered by [ ] hand [ ] mail to Earl G. Xaiz, Yengich, Rich &
Xaiz, attorneys for defendant/appellant, 175 East 400 South, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, UT
84111, this _/9_ day of March, 2007.
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Addenda

Addendum A

Westkw,
UT ST § 76-8-316
U.C.A. 1953 § 76-8-316

t>
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 76. Utah Criminal Code
*i Chapter 8. Offenses Against The Administration of Government
*I Part 3. Obstructing Governmental Operations
-•§ 76-8-316. Influencing, impeding,
of the Board of Pardons and Parole

or

retaliating

against

a judge or

member

(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if the person threatens to
assault, kidnap, or murder a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole
with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge or member of
the board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or member's official
duties or with the intent to retaliate against the judge or member on account of
the performance of those official duties.
(2) A person is guilty of a second degree felony if the person commits an assault
on a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole with the intent to
impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge or member of the board while
engaged in the performance of the judge's or member's official duties, or with the
intent to retaliate against the judge or member on account of the performance of
those official duties.
(3) A person is guilty of a first degree felony if the person commits aggravated
assault or attempted murder on a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and
Parole with the purpose to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge or
member of the board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or member's
official duties or with the purpose to retaliate against the judge or member on
account of the performance of those official duties.
(4) As used in this section:
(a) "Immediate family" means
siblings of the officer.

parents,

spouse,

surviving

spouse,

children,

and

(b) "Judge" means judges of all courts of record and courts not of record.
(c) "Judge
family.
(d) "Member
board.

or member"

of

the

includes

Board

of

the

members

Pardons

and

(5) A member of the Board of Pardons
purposes of Subsection 76-5-202(1) (k) .

of

the

Parole"

and

Parole

judge's

means

is

or member's

appointed

an

immediate

members

executive
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for

Wfestlara
18U.S.C.A. § 115
C

United States Code Annotated Currentness
Title 18. Crimes and Criminal Procedure (Refs & Annos)
*£i Part I. Crimes (Refs & Annos)
*i Chapter 7. Assault
-»§ 115. Influencing, impeding, or retaliating against a Federal official by threatening or injuring a
family member
(a)(1) Whoever--:•••'• .
(A) assaults, kidnaps, or murders, or attempts or conspires to kidnap or murder, or threatens to assault, kidnap or
murder a member of the immediate family of a United States official, a United States judge, a Federal law
enforcement officer, or an official whose killing would be a crime under section 1114 of this title; or
(B) threatens to assault, kidnap, or murder, a United States official, a United States judge, a Federal law
enforcement officer, or an official whose killing would be a crime under such section,
with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with such official, judge, or law enforcement officer while engaged in
the performance of official duties, or with intent to retaliate against such official, judge, or law enforcement officer
on account of the performance of official duties, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(2) Whoever assaults, kidnaps, or murders, or attempts or conspires to kidnap or murder, or threatens to assault,
kidnap, or murder, any person who formerly served as a person designated in paragraph (1), or a member of the
immediate family of any person who formerly served as a person designated in paragraph (1), with intent to
retaliate against such person on account of the performance of official duties during the term of service of such
person, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
(b)(1) An assault in violation of this section shall be punished as provided in section 111 of this title.
(2) A kidnapping, attempted kidnapping, or conspiracy to kidnap in violation of this section shall be punished as
provided in section 1201 of this title for the kidnapping or attempted kidnapping of, or a conspiracy to kidnap, a
person described in section 1201(a)(5) of this title.
(3) A murder, attempted murder, or conspiracy to murder in violation of this section shall be punished as provided
in sections 1111, 1113, and 1117 of this title.
(4) A threat made in violation of this section shall be punished by a fine under this title or imprisonment for a term
of not more than 10 years, or both, except that imprisonment for a threatened assault shall not exceed 6 years.
(c) As used in this section, the term—
(1) "Federal law enforcement officer" means any officer, agent, or employee of the United States authorized by
law or by a Government agency to engage in or supervise the prevention, detection, investigation, or prosecution
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

18U.S.C.A. § 115..
of any violation of Federal criminal law;
(2) "immediate family member" of an individual means—
(A) his spouse, parent, brother or sister, child or person to whom he stands in loco parentis; or
(B) any other person living in his household and related to him by blood or marriage;
(3) "United States judge" means any judicial officer of the United States, and includes a justice of the Supreme
Court and a United States magistrate judge; and
(4) "United States official" means the President, President-elect, Vice President, Vice President-elect, a Member
of Congress, a member-elect of Congress, a member of the executive branch who is the head of a depaitment
listed in 5 U.S.C. 101, or the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
(d) This section shall not interfere with the investigative authority of the United States Secret Service, as provided
under sections 3056, 871, and 879 of this title.

yw&em
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 504
C
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos)
*I Article V. Privileges
-•RULE 504. LAWYER-CLIENT
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "client" is a person, including a public officer, or corporation, association, or other organization or entity,
either public or private, who is rendered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a lawyer with a
view to obtaining professional legal services.
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to practice law in
any state or nation.
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the lawyer in a rendition of professional legal
services.
(4) A "representative of the client" is one having authority to obtain professional legal services, or to act on
advice rendered pursuant thereto, on behalf of the client, or one specifically authorized to communicate with the
lawyer concerning a legal matter.
(5) A "communication" includes advice given by the lawyer in the course of representing the client and includes
disclosures of the client and the client's representatives to the lawyer or the lawyer's representative incidental to
the professional relationship.
(6) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom
disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those reasonably
necessary for the transmission of the communication.
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent any other person from
disclosing confidential communications made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services to the client between the client and the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and
lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's
representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, in any combination.
(c) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client, the client's guardian or
conservator, the personal representative of a deceased client, or the successor, trustee, or similar representative of a
corporation, association, or other organization, whether or not in existence. The person who was the lawyer at the
time of the communication is presumed to have authority to claim the privilege on behalf of the client.
(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 504
anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or
fraud; or
(2) Claimants Through Same Deceased Client. As to a communication relevant to an issue between parties who
claim through the same deceased client, regardless of whether the claims are by testate or intestate succession or
by inter vivos transaction; or
(3) Breach of Duty by Lawyer or Client. As to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the
lawyer to the client or by the client to the lawyer; or
(4) Document Attested by Lawyer. As to a communication relevant to an issue concerning a document to which
the lawyer is an attesting witness; or
(5) Joint Clients. As to a communication relevant to a matter of common interest between two or more clients if
the communication was made by any of them to a lawyer retained or consulted in common, when offered in an
action between any of the clients.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
Rule 504 is based upon proposed Rule 503 of the United States Supreme Court. Rule 504 would replace and
supersede Utah Code Ann. § 78-24-8(2) and is intended to be consistent with the ethical obligations of
confidentiality set forth in Rule 1.6 of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct.
The Committee revised the proposed rule of the United States Supreme Court to address the issues raised in
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 101 S.Ct. 677 (1981), as to when communications involving
representatives of a corporation are protected by the privilege. The Committee rejected limiting the privilege to
members of the "control group" and added as subparagraph (a)(4) a definition for "representative of the client" that
includes within the privilege disclosures not only of the client and the client's formal spokesperson, but also
employees who are specifically authorized to communicate to the lawyer concerning a legal matter. The word
"specifically" is intended to preclude a general authorization from the client for the client's employees to
communicate under the cloak of the privilege, but is intended to allow the client, as related to a specific matter, to
authorize the client's employees as "representatives" to disclose information to the lawyer as to that specific matter
with confidence that the disclosures will remain within the lawyer-client privilege.
A "representative" of the lawyer need not be directly paid by the lawyer as long as the representative meets the
requirement of being engaged to assist the lawyer in providing legal services. Thus, a person paid directly by the
client but working under the control and direction of the lawyer for the purposes of providing legal services
satisfies the requirements of subparagraph (a)(3). Similarly, a representative of the client who may be an
independent contractor, such as an independent accountant, consultant or person providing other services, is a
representative of the client for purposes of subparagraph (a)(5) if such person has been engaged to provide services
reasonably related to the subject matter of the legal services or whose service is necessary to provide such service.
The client is entitled not only to refuse to disclose the confidential communication, but also to prevent disclosure
by the lawyer or others who were involved in the conference or learned, without the knowledge of the client, the
content of the confidential communication. Problems of waiver are dealt with by Rule 507.
Under subparagraph (b) communications among the various people involved in the legal matter, relating to the
providing of legal services, are all privileged, except for communications between clients. Those are privileged
only if they are part of a conference with others involved in legal services.
Subparagraph (c) allows the "successor, trustee, or similar representative of a corporation, association, or other
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organization, whether or not in existence" to claim the privilege. Where there is a dispute as to which of several
persons has claims to the rights of a previously existing entity, the court will be required to determine from the
facts which entity's claim is most consistent with the purposes of this rule.
The Committee considered and rejected an exception to the rule for communications in furtherance of a tort.
Disallowing the privilege where the lawyer's services are sought in furtherance of a crime or fraud is consistent
with the trend in other states. The Committee considered extending the exception to include "intentional torts," but
concluded that because of the broad range of conduct that may be found to be an intentional tort, such an exception
would create undesirable ambiguities and uncertainties as to when the privilege applies.
The Committee felt that exceptions to the privilege should be specifically enumerated, and further endorsed the
concept that in the area of exceptions, the rule should simply state that no privilege existed, rather than expressing
the exception in terms of a "waiver" of the privilege. The Committee wanted to avoid any possible clashes with the
common law concepts of "waiver."

\fetlaw
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 507

C
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
State Court Rules
Utah Rules of Evidence (Refs & Annos)
*i Article V. Privileges
-•RULE 507. MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the confidential matter or
communication waives the privilege if the person or a predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily
discloses or consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or communication, or fails to take
reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure. This rule does not apply if the disclosure is itself a
privileged communication.
(b) Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of privileged matter is not admissible against the holder of the
privilege if disclosure was
(1) compelled erroneously or
(2) made without opportunity to claim the privilege.
(c)(1) Comment or Inference Not Permitted. The claim of privilege, whether in the present proceeding or upon a
prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel. No inference may be drawn therefrom.
(2) Claiming Privilege Without Knowledge of Jury. In jury cases, proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent
practicable, so as to facilitate the making of claims of privilege without the knowledge of the jury.
(3) Juiy Instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might draw an adverse inference from the
claim of privilege is entitled to instruction that no inference may be drawn therefrom.
(4) Exception. In a civil action, the provisions of subparagraph (c) do not apply when the privilege against
self-incrimination has been invoked.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
The subject matter of Rule 507 was previously included in Utah Rules of Evidence 37, 38, 39 and 40. The
language recommended by the Committee, however, is largely that of proposed Federal Rules 511, 512 and 513,
rules not included among those adopted by Congress.
Proposed Federal Rule 511 became Rule 507(a), replacing Rule 37. Proposed Federal Rule 512 became Rule
507(b), replacing Rule 38. Proposed Federal Rule 513 became Rule 507(c), replacing Rule 39. No replacement
was adopted for Rule 40 since the Committee detemiined that the subject matter of that rule need not be covered by
a rule of evidence.
Subparagraph (a). Since the purpose of evidentiary privileges is the protection of some societal interest or
confidential relationship, the privilege should end when the purpose is no longer served because the holder of the
©2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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pnvilege has allowed disclosuie 01 made disclosuie Foi the same leascn, although Rule 37 requued a knowing
waiver of the pnvilege, Rule 507(a) as diafted does not lequire such knowledge A stiangei to the communication
may testify to an otheiwise privileged communication, if the participants have failed to take leasonable piecautions
to pieserve pnvacy
Subparagraph (b). Once disclosuie of pnvileged matter has occurred, although confidentiality cannot be
restoied, the purpose of the pnvilege may still be served m some instances by pi eventing use of the evidence
against the holder of the privilege For that reason, pnvileged matter may still be excluded when the disclosure
was not voluntary or was made without an opportunity to claim the pnvilege
Subparagraph (c).
(1) Allowing inferences to be drawn fiom the invocation of a privilege might undermine the mteiest or relationship
the privilege was designed to protect
(2) Foi the same reason, the invocation of a pnvilege should not be revealed to the jury Doing so might also result
in unwarranted emphasis on the exclusion of the pnvileged matter
(3) Whether to seek an instruction is left to the judgment of counsel for the party against whom the mfeience might
be drawn If requested, such an instruction is a matter of light
(4) The provisions of subparagraph (c)(4) are not intended to alter the common law rules as to inferences that may
be drawn or as to when a party may comment or be entitled to a jury instruction when the pnvilege has been
invoked

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

RULE 1.0. TERMINOLOGY
(a) "Belief or "believes" denotes that the person involved actually supposed
the fact in question to be true. A person's belief may be inferre4 from
circumstances.
(b) "Confirmed in writing," when used in reference to the informed consent
of a person, denotes informed consent that is given in writing by the person or
a writing that a lawyer promptly transmits to the person confirming an oral
informed consent. See paragraph (f) for the definition of "informed consent."
If it is not feasible to obtain or transmit the writing at the time the person gives
informed consent, then the lawyer must obtain or transmit it within a reasonable time thereafter.
(c) "Consult" or "consultation" denotes communication of information rea^
sonably sufficient to permit the client to appreciate the significance of the
matter in question.
(d) "Firm" or "law firm" denotes a lawyer or lawyers in a law partnership,
professional corporation, sole proprietorship or other association authorized to
practice law; or lawyers employed in a legal services organization or the legal
department of a corporation or other organization.
(e) "Fraud" or "fraudulent" denotes conduct that is fraudulent under the
substantive or procedural law of the applicable jurisdiction and has a purpose
to deceive.
(f) "Informed consent" denotes the agreement by a person to a proposed
course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information
and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.
(g) "Knowingly," "know" or "knows" denotes actual knowledge of the fact
in question. A person's knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.
(h) "Partner" denotes a member of a partnership, a shareholder in a law
firm organized as a professional corporation, or a member of an association
authorized to practice law.
(i) "Reasonable" or "reasonably" when used in relation to conduct by a
lawyer denotes the conduct of a reasonably prudent and competent lawyer.
(j) "Reasonable belief" or "reasonably believes" when used in reference to a
lawyer denotes that the lawyer believes the matter in question and that the
circumstances are such that the belief is reasonable.
(k) "Reasonably should know" when used in reference to a lawyer denotes
that a lawyer of reasonable prudence and competence would ascertain the
matter in question.
(/) "Screened" denotes the isolation of a lawyer from any participation in a
matter through the timely imposition of procedures within a firm that are
reasonably adequate under the circumstances to protect information that the
isolated lawyer is obligated to protect under these Rules or other law.

(m) "Substantial" when used in reference to degree or extent denotes a
material matter of clear and weighty importance.
(n) "Tribunal" denotes a court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding or a legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in an
adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative agency or other body
acts in an adjudicative capacity when a neutral official, after the presentation of
evidence or legal argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal
judgment directly affecting a party's interests in a particular matter.
(o) "Writing" or "written" denotes a tangible or electronic record of a
communication or representation, including handwriting, typewriting, printing,
photostating, photography, audio or videorecording and e-mail. A "signed"
writing includes an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically
associated with a writing and executed or adopted by a person with the intent
to sign the writing.
[Amended effective November 1, 2005.]

RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

R U L E 1,6. CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a
client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly
authorized in order to carry out the representation or the disclosure is permitted by paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal information relating to the representation of a client
to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(b)(1) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm;
(b)(2) to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain to result in substantial injury to the financial interest or property of
another and in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services;
(b)(3) to prevent,mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is reasonably certain to result or has resulted
from the client's commission of a crime or fraud and in furtherance of which
the client has used the lawyer's services;
(b)(4) to secure legal advice about the lawyer's compliance with these Rules;
(b)(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or
civil Jiclaim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was
involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of the client; or
(b)(6) to comply with other law or a court order.
(c) For purposes of this rule, representation of a client includes counseling a
lawyer about the need for or availability of treatment for substance abuse or
psychological or emotional problems by members of the Utah State Bar serving
on an Utah State Bar endorsed lawyer assistance program.
[Amended effective November 1, 2005.]
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R. Don Brown #0464
S evi e r—County—At-t o r n e y —
Sevier County Justice Complex
835 East 300 North, Suite 100
Richfield, Utah 84701
Telephone: (435) 896-2675

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

:
A F F I D A V I T

VS.

:

JEFFERY K. JOHNSON,
DOB: 09/22/69

:
Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SEVIER

:

Case No.
Judge

)
: ss.
)

Deputy Dusty Torgerson, being duly sworn on oath, deposes
and states as follows:
1.

The undersigned has investigated allegations that the

Defendant has threatened the lives of two judges who have been
involved in determining issues in litigation involving the Defendant.
2.

Attached hereto and incorporated herein is a statement

from the Defendant's attorney detailing threats made.
3.

That the alternation between the Defendant and Doug

Neeley which is recited in the attorney's statement was observed by
law enforcement officers and confirms his agitated state.

Page 2-—Affidavit
State of Utah vs. Jeffery K. Johnson

4.

The Defendant is believed to be extremely dangerous and

mentally unstable and is a danger to the community.
5.

An arrest warrant is necessary for the protection of the

judges, attorneys, and the public.
DATED this c$cP^

day of September, 2005.

C__D©8T£

T0£GERICON

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me thi! • < & * *

day of

September, 2005.

i

BELINDA CARTER
Notary Public
1
State of Utth
MyCawnWon &qpfett6M$-200t
200No*G»HomiiAv»,8**,UTMtW)

NOTARY PUBLIC J /} x
Residing at ^$//4<A,
My Commission Expires 0l/E) /DK

M.JOYJELTE
Attorney at Law
140 West 9000 South, Suite 10
Sandy, Utah 84070-2033
Telephone 801-567-1855
Facsimile 801-567-1886

September 20, 2005
Officer Dusty Torgerson
Sevier County Sheriff
835 East 300 North, Suite 200
Richfield, Utafr84701
Re: Jeffery K. Johnson
Dear Mr. Torgerson:
Please find enclosed my witness statement I will be mailing to you the taped telephone
from September 16, 2005.
Sincerely,

M. Joy Jelte
Attorney at Law

September 20, 2005
Page 2
On June 27. 2005, Jeff Johnson told me that the problem, as he saw his situation and
specifically attorney Doug Neeley, was in 'leaving him alive/'
On September 13, 2005, Jeff Johnson called me from (505) 598-4058 at 1:57 p.m. and told
me the following:
1.
2.
.3.
4.
5.
6.

7.
8.

"His life will end," (Jeff was referring at that time to Doug Neeley.)
Jeff intends to "work outside the law. I don't really care [what happens],
there will be justice.55
Jeff stated that Judge Lyman was "right up there with them." He was
referring to Judge Mower, attorney Doug Neeley and attorney Dale Eyre.
Jeff stated that he had "given up on the legal system" and Tasked him what he
meant. He stated that it meant, "what 1 decide" and that it would mean a loss
of home, family and job,
Jeff stated that he was intending to take the opportunity to take Doug Neeley
down.
I asked Jeff to consider the impact of his actions on his children and his
parents. His response was that his parents would soon be dead; that he would
wait until they were gone; and that his actions would not impact their lives.
He stated that he had already lost his children in that he did not intend to ever
see them again.
I asked Jeff if he was planning to kill, shoot or bomb someone and his
response was, "I'm not saying."
He stated that he did not care about prison.

On September 16, 2005, I telephoned Jeff Johnson from my office and Jeff told me the
following:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Jeff stated that Judge Mower was "going to have what's coming to him."
Jeff stated that he does not have any faith in the legal system and that he'd
take care of it himself.
Jeff said two or three times that, "after the first one, the rest are free,"
Jeff stated that they could put him in jail or take his guns, but that it would
just "piss me off more,"
I asked Jeff to thing about his children and Jeff stated that he did not plan to
see his children anymore.
Jeff stated, "I will take out a bunch of people with me; Fm not going out by
myself.5'
Jeff talked about the need for the men in Utah to get angry enough to knock
off the judges in order to remedy the way that justice is administered.
Jeff that if he could "get" four to five people in Sanpete and Sevier County,
and ccthey take me out...it's a betteT world and if I can take out their DNA
offspring its even better,"

September 20, 2005
Page 3
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Jeff stated that he had confided in a buddy about his plans and his buddy
replied that he wouldn't get caught, but he would go to Hell.
Jeff called it a "damn good plan."
Jeff stated that as far as Doug Neeley was concerned, he was going to "take
away his kids."
I asked Jeff for the name of his buddy, but he would not reveal it. I asked him
to tell me what he planned to do and he stated, "go out with a bang."
Jeff stated, "There will be justice; if I can get four or five, and they still catch
me, Vm ahead."

On September 19,2005. Jeff appeared in Judge Mower's courtroom for a hearing scheduled
at 11:15 a.mu Jeff confronted Doug Neeley in the courtroom demanding that Mr. Neeley pay over
to him $ 150,000.00. As he left the courthouse, Jeff stopped by the entrance door and told me "that
asshole is going to die and all of his family." There was a bailiff standing across the room by the
metal detector. There were a few witnesses and/or parties waiting along the benches across from the
conference and court rooms. I do not know whether anyone else overheard Jeff s parting statement.
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P R O C E E D I N G S

2

(Electronically recorded on unknown date)

3

(Phone number dialed and ringing)

4

MR. JOHNSON:

5

MS. JELTE:

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7

MS. JELTE:

Hello?
Hi.

Jeff, this is Joy Jelte.

I didn't

How are you?
I almost expected to get your answering

8

machine.

9

for the hearing on Monday, but I don't have your checklist.

10
11

—

I just got the transcript from the court reporter
I

thought you were going to fax something to me.
MR. JOHNSON:

I really just don't have a fax —

the only

12

guestions I have is how come the Judge never addressed Neeley

13

about the protective order.

14
15
16

MS. JELTE:

Yeah.

It's not addressed in it.
I think the way he addressed it was

by dismissing it.
MR. JOHNSON:

And the only other thing is do I have to

17

pay back alimony when she's still drawing from my 401-K?

18

ought to be the same, because my 401-K stops back in March.

19

MS. JELTE:

20

MR. JOHNSON:

21

MS. JELTE:

23

MR. JOHNSON:

25

Uh-huh.
Or else my alimony should start from the

day the decree is signed.

22

24

It all

Okay, wait.

Say it again.

She's still taking that —- she'll still

get money out of my 401-K; it's $500 a ironth.
MS. JELTE:

Uh-huh.
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MR. JOHNSON:

That should go back to March.

She'll be

2

able to quit then, and I'll owe back alimony or else —

3

whatever, start paying alimony from the time the decree is

4

signed.

5

MS. JELTE:

Oh, okay.

I apologize.

yeah,

I haven't looked

6

at your file, and so I'm not real up to speed on what the issues

7

are.

8

looking at the transcript and then going to the objection and

9

then looking back at the other notes and so on.

I plan on doing that over the weekend, starting with first

So I'm going to

10

have to get up to speed on it before I do anything else.

11

going to be going to Richfield?

12

MR. JOHNSON:

13

MS. JELTE:

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

MS. JELTE:

Are you

For the Court date?
Uh-huh.
Yeah.
Okay, because between now and then we'll

16

probably need to talk probably once —

17

issues are and what position you want to take and so on.

18

but I probably won't give you a call back until Sunday when I get

19

into it a little bit more.

20

MR. JOHNSON:

21

MS. JELTE:

22

once more about what the
So

Okay.
I'm not going to spend that much time with

it tonight other than to maybe glance at the transcript.

23

MR. JOHNSON:

24

MS. JELTE:

25

MR. JOHNSON:

—

Okay.
I hope you're feeling better.
It's just the same.

It doesn't ever

1

change.

2

MS. JELTE:

Well, you get to see Caden.

3

MR. JOHNSON:

4

MS. JELTE:

5

MR. JOHNSON:

6

MS. JELTE:

7

MR. JOHNSON:

That's good.

Yeah, but do I want to see Caden?
Sure, you do.
I'm pretty much writing him off.
Why is that?
It's not worth it.

It's not worth it

8

every time I want to see him to have to go to Court or deal with

9

attorneys to see him.

10

MS. JELTE:

11

MR. JOHNSON:

When was the last time you saw him?
July, 1st of July.

So if she wants me

12

miserable that's fine, but Caden —

13

support, but he's not getting any inheritance and he's not

14

getting a dad.

15

this whole situation.

That's that.

yeah, he'll get his child

I've had it.

I'm totally out of

16

MS. JELTE:

17

to handle your son.

18

you're a better dad than that.

19

think it will pass and I think you'll get on with your life and

20

things will get better.

21

Well, I don't think that that's the best way
He cares about you a lot, and I think that

MR. JOHNSON:

I know you're frustrated, but I

But one thing about it, when he gets older

22

he can ask questions why, and I'll tell him then, but I —

23

know, I'm not —

24
25

I've had it.

MS. JELTE:
him lately?

you

What about your other son?

Have you seen
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2

MR. JOHNSON:

MS. JELTE:
will —

5

I think

I know you feel that way right now, but it

—

MR. JOHNSON:

You can't tell me in 20 years I'm going to

6

feel it's right.

7

can't tell me I'll think better about it in 20 years.

8
9
10

I lost $200,000 and she made a profit.

MS. JELTE:

No, I was saying you'd think —

I think right now you're
MR. JOHNSON:

The Judge hasn't ruled in on one thing to

help me not one time, not either Judge.

13

to come around.

14

17

MS. JELTE:
and

—
MR. JOHNSON:

He's a slime ball.

19

MR. JOHNSON:

I think

hypocrite.

21

doesn't follow the law.

25

—

All of the Mowers —

20

24

He's a liar and he's

unethical, and he's going to have what's coming to him.
MS. JELTE:

23

So no, I'm never going

Well, I think Mower tries to do a good job,

18

22

I think you

—

12

16

You

need to wait and let us get through the emotions and everything.

11

15

So yep, I

think the Court system in Utah is screwed up.

3
4

Oh, I talk to him quite often.

He doesn't follow the law.

MS. JELTE:

yeah, he's a

He's the Judge.

I think that when you —

He

you need to reserve

judgment until we get through this next hearing.
MR. JOHNSON:
to change.

Well, we'll see, but I'm —

I think Lyman is a piece of shit.

it's not going

-:..;••-••;;'

,

- ; • , • • , • ; , '

,.

MS. JELTE:

,'.

.

•

-

7

-

I know it would have helped if he had heard

your motion about the debts before you finally couldn't take it
anymore and filed bankruptcy.
I —

I know that would have helped, but

that Judge, too, Lyman, I think, tries to
MR. JOHNSON:

—

How can the Judge sit there and think,

okay, you have a hundred and some thousand dollars income, and
you take half the income away and give the guy all the bills and
have him pay it all and think, well, it's going to be rosy, and
that go a year?
You know what?
any time?
./

Oh, but give her all the assets in the meantime.
Fair and equitable, did that come into play at

I don't think so.
MS. JELTE:

and that

Well, you still have the right to appeal,

—
MR. JOHNSON:

:•>.;' MS. JELTE:
:

No.

Yeah, but what good is that going to do?
That's

MR. JOHNSON:
MS. JELTE:

—

Really.

—

It's in Utah.

20 days from the date that the decree is

finally signed.
MR. JOHNSON:

I think, you know what, the better way

I have no faith in the Court system.
all.

—

I have no faith in it at

The only way it's ever going to be fair is when people make

it fair.
MS. JELTE:
MR. JOHNSON:
else is playing by.

Well

—

They go by the same principles everybody
Does Neeley play by the rules?

No.

Does
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the Court system play by the rules?

2

Do they follow the law?

3

signing —

4

He's not following the law on judgments he's making.

5

following the law.

So how can he expect people to follow the

6

law if he refuses?

It's not going to happen.

7

Is the Court system fair?

No, they don't.

You've got Lyman

I'm not even represented, and he's signing bills.

MS. JELTE:

He's not

Well, I think if you go back to that first

8

hearing, I think you've forgotten about what she was testifying

9

to about how she thought that the bills were generated because

10

from debt that you had acquired and that had been rolled over.

11
12

I That's where Lyman was coming from.
MR. JOHNSON:

And so it's safe to say that the Court

13

thinks that she should live in a house rent free, be able to

14

pocket all the cash she wants and live rent free, free of any

15

obligations for two years and be fine.

16

She wasn't paying for the house.

17

MS. JELTE:

18

MR. JOHNSON:

19

MS. JELTE:

She has no obligation.

The Court system is screwed.

I think Judge Lyman

—

He's an asshole.
Well, I think one of the reasons he got off

20

the case had to do with concerns about that ex parte protective

21

order and having Judge Mower hear it to have somebody fresh and

22

anew to try to resolve the case.

23

he missed some points, and that's what the hearing on Monday is

24

about, is to try to get him to try to close up those holes in

25

your case and get that resolved.

I think Mower tried.

I think

—
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MR. JOHNSON:
change.

But the end judgment is not going to

I'm still screwed.

3

MS. JELTE:

I think if you can just —

4

this hearing.

5

feel a lot better and things will

I think you'll feel better, and I think you'll

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7

MS. JELTE:

8

let's get through

Well

—

—

If you just give it some time and distance.

Then if you want to pursue your appeal, fine, but

9

MR. JOHNSON:

—

Maybe I'll appeal it, maybe I won't, but

10

I don't have any faith in the legal system.

11

myself, because you know what? Yeah, there's too much corruption.

12

I've seen all —

13

County, and you know what?

14

After one, the rest are free.

15

MS. JELTE:

16

MR. JOHNSON:

17

MS. JELTE:

18

MR. JOHNSON:

19

could

I can handle it by

I've seen firsthand the corruption in Sevier
I'm not going to take it no more.

I'm sorry, what did you say?
After one, the rest are free.
Oh.
I've had it.

This has went as bad as it

—

20

(Tape cuts out and then starts again)

21

MS. JELTE:

22

MR. JOHNSON:

But your parents

—

And they can put me in jail.

They can put me in jail for 60 days.

You know

23

what?

They can put me in

24

jail for a year, and all it's going to do is piss me off more.

25

They can take away my guns, and all it's going to do is piss me

\

•

•

.

•

•

•

.

•

'

•

-

•

;

•

•

'

•

'

1

off more.

I've had it.

2

what?

3

to take care of it by myself.

4

•;

5

of your children, and I think

"

-

.

'

•

•

'

.

-

'

•

"

'

"

-

1

0

It's injust, it's corrupt, and you know

The legal system is so injust and corrupt, that I'm going

\

MS. JELTE:

6

That's all there is to it.

I think you need to be thinking about both

MR. JOHNSON:

—

I'm not —

7

both of my children anymore.

8

stage in the game, you know what?

9

you know what?

MS. JELTE:

11

MR. JOHNSON:
with me.

.
I don't even plan on seeing

I was a damn good dad, but this
That's not even —

I don't

—

It doesn't even matter.

10

12

•

Jeff, are you suicidal right now?
Only after I take out a bunch of people

I'm not going to go by myself.

13

MS. JELTE:

14

parents who love you dearly.

I can guarantee it.

Well, you've got two really wonderful

15

MR. JOHNSON:

16

MS. JELTE:

17

MR. JOHNSON:

And that's not the problem.

No.
The problem is the damn system.

The

18

problem is, she makes a profit and I go bust.

19

my first attorney before I talked to you said, "Lyman has already

20

judged on you because of the shit that Dale Eyre told him."

21

know what?

22

about me.

23
24
25

You

Dale Eyre and the Judge are not even supposed to talk

MS. JELTE:
,

The problem is

MR. JOHNSON:
MS. JELTE:

You've got two beautiful children.
And I wrote them both off.
And you've got two wonderful parents, and

"
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you need to think about how your decisions will affect those

2

people.

3

MR. JOHNSON:

And you know what?

If 20 years ago, if 5

4

years ago, if 10 years ago men would stand up and say, "You know

5

what?

6

their own, maybe somebody would say, "You know what?

7

isn't right.

8

Maybe this isn't right."

9
10

I'm tired of being screwed by Utah," and take action on
Maybe this

We're getting Judges knocked off left and right.

MS. JELTE:

It's called working with your Legislature

and working —

11

MR. JOHNSON:

No, the law is just. When the Legislature

12

says "fair and equitable," when they write a protective order

13

and said if the person is attacked and they attack back in self-

14

defense, if they do something in self-defense then it shouldn't

15

be held to a protective order.

16

who says, "Oh, yeah, it's fine for somebody to attack in self-

17

defense, and if you respond back then it's malicious," he's not

18

following the Legislature.

19

anywhere in my case is fair and equitable.

20

MS. JELTE:

21

MR. JOHNSON:

Then you look at Judge Lyman

Fair and equitable, I don't think

That's when you ta.-ce it up on appeal.
No, that's — by —

you know what?

So I

22

can spend 4 0 more thousand dollars and get it stuck up my ass

23

again. No.

24
25

MS. JELTE:
from —

if you —

The problem is is that what —

if you —
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MR. JOHNSON:

The only problem is, I don't care.

If I

2

can get four or five people in Sanpete and Sevier County and they

3

take me out, it's a better world, isn't it?

4

MS. JELTE:

5

MR. JOHNSON:

6

—

And if I can take out their DNA offspring,

it's even better.

7
8

No, hon, that's

MS. JELTE:

Hon, that's not the way you solve the

problem.

9

MR. JOHNSON:

10

MS. JELTE:

It is at this point.

No, because then all you're going to do is

11

break your parents' heart and devastate your children, and your

12

children will be —

13

face.

14
15

have this legacy that is horrible for them to

You're too good a man for that.
MR. JOHNSON:

upset.

16

You're upset right now.

No, I've been upset for years.

I'm past

I want justice.
MS. JELTE:

Jeff, ever since I've met you you've been a

17

real concerned dad about your children and what you wanted for

18

them.

19

MR. JOHNSON:

It's past that.

It's past that.

20

State of Utah doesn't give a shit about my kids.

21

know what?

22

to death when I had him.

The -- you

Judge Lyman didn't give a fuck if I starved Jordan
He didn't care about kids.

23

MS. JELTE:

24

children, and you know that.

25

The

MR. JOHNSON:

You would break your parents' heart and your

But if the world's a better place after I
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leave, you know what?

2

That's all that matters, right?

MS. JELTE:

I don't know what you're planning, hon, but

3

I just —

4

about, and I'm serious.

5

I want you not to do whatever it is you're thinking

MR. JOHNSON:

You know what?

I told my buddy about it.

6

I've got a pretty close friend, and he told me —

7

know what, you're not going to get caught, but you're going to go

8

to hell."

9

he said, "You

It's worth it.
MS. JELTE:

I wish your friend had told you to —

10

to do whatever it is you're talking about doing.

11

sound like much of a friend to me.

12

MR. JOHNSON:

13

make the world a better place.

14

MS. JELTE:

15

MR. JOHNSON:

It's just you know what?

not

It doesn't

You've got the

That's not making the world a better place.
Of course it is.

You know what?

Once

16

a Judge gets on the bench, they're held -- they don't have any

17

accountability.

18

you can screw somebody, and work outside the law and sit up there

19

and lie, you know what?

You know what?

If being an attorney is how bad

There's no accountability there.

20

(Tape cuts out and then starts again)

21

MR. JOHNSON:

22

MS. JELTE:

23

MR. JOHNSON:

24

MS. JELTE:

25

be stupid?

Guess what?
Who's your friend that -I'm that somebody.
Who's your friend that's encouraging you to
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MR. JOHNSON:

No, he's not encouraging me.

He's telling

2

me I'm going to hell; but it's a damn good plan, so you know

3

what?

4

MS. JELTE:

5

MR. JOHNSON:

6

Neeley is an asshole.

7

have took the steps that he took, I'm sure me and the ex could

8

have got back together.

9

MS. JELTE:

10

MR. JOHNSON:

11

MS. JELTE:

Who are you talking about?
Nobody.

Nobody else needs to be in this.

You know what?

To this day if he wouldn't

I don't know that Corrinne
You know what, me

—

—

I don't know that Corrinne was asking him

12

for advice on whether to reconcile.

I think he was pretty

13

shocked that you guys were trying to reconcile.

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

I know he distorted the facts.

16

he's had multiple affairs.

17

If he's going to screw me for everything he can, for money,

18

legal or not, you know, he'll do whatever he can, then he should

19

anticipate me screwing him for every way I can, legal or not.

20

he has no ethics, he shouldn't expect people he's screwing to

21

have ethics.

MS. JELTE:

23

MR. JOHNSON:

25

I don't really care.

I know he's an asshole.

So you know what?

I know

He's an asshole.

If

You know, that's the bottom line.

22

24

Well, you know what?

So

—
He took away my kids.

I'll take away his

kids.
MS. JELTE:

So what are you planning on doing, kiddo?
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2

MR. JOHNSON:

I don't think I'll tell you, you know.

It

won't benefit you, and I know it won't benefit me if I tell you.

3

MS. JELTE:

Well, I know one thing.

You —

I don't

—

4

it doesn't matter what you're talking about doing or what you're

5

thinking about doing.

6

to —

7

talk to them about how angry and upset you are

8

if you need to sit down with a counselor or somebody and

MR. JOHNSON:

9

I don't think so.

10

I don't think so.

11 I
12
13

You need to just not do it, and you need

—

Is that going to give me my $300,000 back?

Is that going to make Neeley a better person?

MS. JELTE:

But who cares about how Neeley is or who he

is or what he does in the future?
MR. JOHNSON:

It's called justice. Why should I continue

14

to sit idly by and let him fuck people ever, to let him do it to

15

somebody else.

16

it's the game; but with people involved it's not.

I know with you it's •— you know, it's the job,

17

MS. JELTE:

18

MR. JOHNSON:

19

I don't think that
Okay.

—

If Neeley writes me a check for

$150,000, I'll call it even with him.

20

MS. JELTE:

And what does the Judge have to do?

21

MR. JOHNSON:

Well, if he —

let's see, the Judge.

I

22

think Sevier County Judge Mower, he's the one that signed the

23

protective order for her to go remove everything except for my

24 J personal shaving articles, and steel.
25 | So I think he can make up for that.

He won't give them back.
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MS. JELTE:

2

MR. JOHNSON

3

I don't know

If Neeley gives m€> the 150

grand, I gue ss we'll be even, won't we?

4

MS. JELTE:

5

MR. JOHNSON:

6

MS. JELTE:

7

MR. JOHNSON:

8

And what about Judge Lyman?

Well, Jeff

—

But I don't .see that happening.
No, it's not going to happen.
It's not going to happen.

So the re's just

life, liberty and justice for all.

9

MS. JELTE:

You said the o1ther day something that really

10

scared me, Jeff.

11

would end.

12

involve ending anybody's life.

13

MR. JOHNSON:

You said that you —

that Doug Neeley' s life

Now, I don't know what you're planning, but it can't
You know that.

So when you <jo into Court and youi take

14

everybody's everything, and you lie to do it, you know, I don't

15

know.

16

do anything to get to those ends.

He dc e sn't care what happens to my life.

17

MS. JELTE:

18

MR. JOHNSON

19
20

I -- remember '.le's

He'll 1 ie, he'll

—

I'm tired of being fucked with.

I'm tired

of it.
MS. JELTE:

I think you're just -- I think you' re just

21

upset right now, and I think that -- I'm going to check on you

22

tomorrow or —

23

MR. JOHNSON

24

MS. JELTE:

25

MR. JOHNSON :

Joy
—

—

either tomorrow or the next day.
Joy, I'm not suicidal.
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MS. JELTE:

2

MR. JOHNSON:

3

suicide.

MS. JELTE:

5

MR. JOHNSON:

MS. JELTE:

8

MR. JOHNSON:

10

It's not

I really am worried about you.
Well, you know what, maybe people ought to

I'd like to see you

—

You know, in the whole Court situation

maybe the Judge ought to consider, "Maybe I should follow the
law."

11

MS. JELTE:

12

MR. JOHNSON:

13

MS. JELTE:

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

MS. JELTE:

16

MR. JOHNSON:

17

Justice.

follow the law.

7

9

I am not suicidal.

It's justice.

4

6

Pardon me?

And so what are you

—

That's not going to happen.
—

going to do?
Go out with a bang.

No, you're not going to do that.
No.

No, actually, I plan on —

Look

—

just

justice, Joy.

18

MS. JELTE:

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

after one, the rest are free.

21

MS. JELTE:

Look

—

Because the time they catch up with me,
Yep, I'll make my mark.

No, hon, you're not going to do that.

22

You re going to

23

you rre going to go talk to somebody abo at it

24

go cand see if you can j ust get clear headed tso that you don' t do

25

something stupid.

— you' re " ust going to take a deep breath, and
and you're going to
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MR. JOHNSON:

2

MS. JELTE:

3

MR. JOHNSON:

I have counseling for free, Joy.

Well, then go.
They're not going to get my money

4

back.

5

It just seems like everybody else has no idea.- 7v-'-.:-'.":

6

You know what?

Why?

.

MS« JELTE:

I know what's right.

I know that whatever —

I know what's just.'

if y o u — you know,

7

if you — t h e other day you were talking about hurting Doug and

8

you were talking about hurting the Judge, and you were talking

9

about hurting —

10

is —

11

justice?

12

taking away property and family and so on.

all you're talking about is destruction.

That

So how is that

It's not.
MR. JOHNSON:

Okay.

When somebody takes away all my

13

property, my family, everything I've worked for, $200,000,

14

totally destroying me, what are they talking about?

15

MS. JELTE:

16

MR. JOHNSON:

17

MS. JELTE:

18

MR. JOHNSON:

Well

—

And they don't follow the law to do it.
You haven't pursued every avenue of appeal.
Joy, how many hundreds of thousands of

19

dollars can I afford in attorney fee —

20

gain back.

21

of thousand dollars is it worth living my life hell to get back

22

justice which they'll never pay the price for.

23

accountability on the other side.

24
25

I'll never gain back.

. M S . JELTE:

fees, which I'll never

For what?

How many hundreds

There is no

There's not.

And so you do something destructive, and you

ruin your life and you ruin your kids' lives and you ruin your
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parents' lives and

2

—

MR. JOHNSON:

Well, you know what?

You know what?

3

the end of the day, the people that are doing the same thing,

4

they won't do it no more.

5

MS. JELTE:

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7

MS. JELTE:

8

MR. JOHNSON:

9

The only -This isn't something I just conjured up.
I

I mean, I've been thinking about this

10

New Mexico.

11

What's right is right.

13

™

since I've been living in Utah.

12

I mean, it was good to move to

I'm damn glad I did, but it's just —

MS. JELTE:

At

Your —

you know what?

Jeff, as far as I can tell, none of

us have the moral right to pass judgment on another human being.

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

MS. JELTE:

But they have, haven't they?
You can get on with your life.

If you do

16

something that ends the life of another person, you disrupt so

17

much, not just your life, but their life and the people that love

18

them

—

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

MS. JELTE:

21
22

Boy, I'd hate to disrupt their life.
—

and the people that love you and are

concerned about you and care about you.
MR. JOHNSON:

And I'm sure that all that consideration

23

went into the judgments and into Court, didn't it?

They was

24

really concerned about how bad they destroyed me, wasn't they?

25

I'm sure it just tore them up.
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2

MS. JELTE:

You don't think your parent s aren't

concerned?

3

It has nothing to do with my parents.

MR. JOHNSON:

4

don't: think my parent.s made judgments.

5

got up on thLe stand and lied, deceived, twisted stories to —

6

know.

7

Neeley, two Judges, and Dale Eyre.

I don't think my parents

It ha s nothing to do with my parents.

8

MS. JELTE:

9

MR. JOHNSON:

10

MS. JELTE:

11

MR. JOHNSON:

12

MS. JELTE:

13

he' s been involved?

14

MR. JOHNSON:

Well, Dale Eyre hasn't been involved in

—

your case in the last

—

Yes, he has.
—

two years.

What makes you think that

Because Dale Eyre was talking to Judge

16

told me that

18

want you to just

19

—

Yes, he has.

Lyman, and the first attorney that was related t D Judge Mclff

MS. JELTE:

you

It has to do with

15

17

I

Oh.

Hon, I'm worried about you.

I just

—

MR. JOHNSON

There's no need to worry, Joy.

20

made up.

21

down here.

I have fun all the time, you know.

22

know what?

There will be justice.

I'm not suicidal.

23

MS. JELTE:

24

MR. JOHNSON

25

MS. JELTE:

I'm not.

My mind is

I have a really good life
It's just you

Yeah, there will be justice —
There will.
-- you'll get caught.
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2

MR. JOHNSON:

Well, you know what?

five and they catch me, so what?

3

MS. JELTE:

4

MR. JOHNSON:

5

MS. JELTE:

Yeah, I am.
No.

to a counselor, okay?

7

MR. JOHNSON:
$200,000.

9

screwed from me.

Hon, look, I want you to just go talk

No.

They're not going to give me back

Neeley is not going to give me back the money he
The Judge sure as hell is not going to give

10

me any money back.

11

awhile.

12

will be a better place.

13

I'm still ahead.

No, you're not ahead.

6

8

If I can get four or

No.

The day will come, and it won't be for

The day will come there will be justice, and the world

MS. JELTE:

Well, as your attorney and your friend,

14

I'm not going to give up on you.

15

this hearing coming up Monday.

16

and checking with you this weekend, because I just think you're

17

just down right now.

18

think

I'm going to be talking with you

It may not feel like you're down, but I

—

19

MR. JOHNSON:

20

MS. JELTE:

21

MR. JOHNSON:

22

MS. JELTE:

23

MR. JOHNSON:

24

We're going to be talking about

I've been down
—

—

you're just depressed.
—

for three years.

Well, what

—

I'm not depressed, Joy.

I mean, after I

get off the phone with you, it's Friday night, I'll go out and

25 I have fun.

I've got things set up for tonight.

I mean, I have a
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good life.

2

MS. JELTE:

3

MR. JOHNSON:

4

MS. JELTE:

5

MR. JOHNSON:

6

MS. JELTE:

8

MR. JOHNSON:

9

MS. JELTE:

MR. JOHNSON:

12

MS. JELTE:

13

MR. JOHNSON:

14

can't follow the law?

15

assigning justice?

16

MS. JELTE:

17

MR. JOHNSON:

18

MS. JELTE:

20

Because

—

There's no justice.

There still has to be

Because

—

There's none in Utah.
But you're not -- no —

you're not the

person who silould go around administering justice.

11

19

Why?

justice.

7

10

Well, then don't blow it.

Then who is that

—

I'm not the person

—

Who is that person?

Is it Judges that

Is that the person that's supposed to be

Yeah, but you're talking

—

Judges that refuse to follow the law?
You're talking about taking action to hurt

somebody else.
MR. JOHNSON:

21

hurt me; yes or no?

22

MS. JELTE:

Did somebody take action against me to
1
We don't live out in a —

we may live out

23

in the west, but we don't act like it.

24

don't kill p eople, we don't harm property, and you know that.

25

1

MR. JOHNSON:

We don't carry guns, we

You'd be surprised what people can live
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through and survive.

2
3

MS. JELTE:

Well, I know people can live through just

about anythi ng and survive, and so can you.

4

MR. JOHNSON:

And so can they.

It' s an equal playing

5 t field, you know. What's fair for the goose is good for the
6

gander.

7

problem with that.

8
9

I'll play by their rules.

I'm not —

If they refuse to followr the law, so be it.

MS. JELTE:

I think you'll feel better after this

hearing.
MR. JOHNSON:

10

You know what?

I doubt it.

11

getting dressed up for this hearing, either.

12

T-shirt and Levis.

13

MS. JELTE:

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

my crew

16

stupid.

I have 11 people on
I'm not

I know you're not stupi.d, but you're talking

MR. JOHNSON:
principle.

21

what's ;just is just.

22

25

Joy, you know what?

We deal with life and death every single day.

20

24

I'm coming in a

stupid right now.

19

23

I'm not

Well, just leave your guns at home.

MS. JELTE:

17
18

I don't have a

No, I'm talking justice.

There's a difference.

MS. JELTE:

I'm talking

This isn' t me -- you know,

I 'm di sappointed in you.

I think you know

better.
But all that said, you know what?

If I

leave it alone, things are just going to go on as usual.

It's

MR. JOHNSON:

1

-241 I just going to keep happening to somebody else.
2

follow the law, and attorney —

3

end sometime.

4

MS. JELTE:

yep.

Judges refuse to

You know what?

It's got to

Look, I'm not going to get in an argument

5

with you about this.

6

clearly, and I think you'll feel better after the next hearing,

7

and I want you to snap out of it.

8
9
10
11
12
13

I just think that you're just not thinking

I'm sincere as your friend, as your lawyer, as a friend
to your parents, as a friend even to your kids, I really want you
to snap out of it, Jeff.
MR. JOHNSON:

You know better.

Well, I don't have anything planned in the

near future.
(Tape cuts out.

No further proceedings on tape.)
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Addendum E

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATS OF UTAH
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
STATB OF UTAH,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

Case No. 051909162

v.

:

Judge Stephen L. Henriod

JEFFERY K. JOHNSON,

:

Date: June 14, 2 006

Defendant.

:

Plaintiff,

This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion in Limine.
Having considered the memoranda submitted by the parties, the Court
enters the following decision and finds that Defendant's Motion should
'be DENIED.
At issue here is whether an attorney is allowed to testify against
a former client regarding threats the client allegedly made against a
number of judges and conveyed to his attorney. Defendant concedes that
Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(1)1 allowed his attorney to
report Defendant's alleged statement to law enforcement authorities in
order to prevent Defendant from acting on the threats.
However,
Defendant argues that his alleged statements are still privileged and so
his attorney cannot testify regarding them in Defendant's criminal
prosecution. The State disagrees and argues that Defendant's statements
were not privileged and, therefore, his attorney is allowed to disclose
the statements during these criminal proceedings.
The Court recognizes that this issue is one of first impression
here in Utah. Additionally, there appears to be a split among the other
limited jurisdictions that have addressed this issue. Therefore, the
Court does not undertake this decision lightly.
However, the Court
finds that Defendant's statements were not privileged and Defendant's
former attorney may testify against Defendant at his trial.
It is clear that only n [c] onf idential disclosures by a client to an
attorney made in order to obtain legal assistance are privileged. The
purpose of the privilege is to encourage clients to make full disclosure
to their attorneys [in order to obtain fully informed legal advice.]"
Fisher
v. U.S.,
425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (internal citations omitted).
Rule 1.6(b)(1) of the Rules of Professional Conduct provides:
(b)
A lav/yers may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary:
(l)(b) to prevent reasonably certain death or substantial bodily harm.
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achieve its purpose. Accordingly it protects only those disclosures necessary to obtain informed legal advice - which might not have been
made absent the privilege."
Id.
Courts seem to have split on how to apply the attorney-client
privilege in circumstances such as these, where a client allegedly makes
threats regarding other individuals to his/her attorney.
The Court,
however, is persuaded by Aviles
v. State,
165 S.W.2d 437 (Tex. Ct. App.
2005) and Hodgson Russ,
LLP v. Trube,
867 So.2d 1246 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2004).
In Aviles,
the court held that when client conveyed a threat to an
interpreter, who conveyed the threat to the client's attorney, that
communication was not privileged because it "was not made for the
rendition of professional legal services and [was] therefore not covered
by the attorney-client privilege." 165 S.W.2d at 439. Defendant argues
that this case is distinguishable because the threat was made to an
interpreter and not to the attorney.
However, Aviles
does seem
applicable because the court found that it was not determinative whether
the interpreter was a representative of the attorney because the
information could not be privileged. Id.
The court stated "Appellant's
communication of a threat to kill his court-appointed interpreter can in
no way be considered necessary to the rendition of legal services for
his pending burglary trial.
We hold that this communication of an
intent to commit a crime is not covered by the attorney-client
privilege, rendering irrelevant the role the interpreter may have been
serving at the time of the communication."
Id.
Similarly, in Hodgson Russ,
the court found that it was proper to
admit an attorney's testimony against his client because "the threat
[made by the client] was extraneous and was not a communication incident
or necessary to obtaining legal advice." 867 So.2d at 1248.
Defendant relies primarily on Purcell
v. District
Attorney,
676
N.E.2d 436 (Mass. 1997). In Purcell,
Mr. Tyree had gone to an attorney,
Mr. Purcell, to discuss an employment matter.
During the course of
those discussions, Tyree made threats to burn down the apartment
building where he had been employed. Id. at 437-38. Purcell considered
these threats credible and reported them to the police.
Id. at 438.
After Tyree was indicted for attempted arson, the district attorney
subpoenaed Purcell to testify. Purcell moved to quash the subpoena and
that issue went up on appeal.
Id.
On appeal, the court found that
there was no question regarding the ethical propriety of Purcell's
disclosure of the threats to the police but that there was an issue
regarding whether Purcell could testify at Tyree's arson trial. The
court stated that the "attorney-client privilege applies only when the
client's communication was for the purpose of facilitating the rendition
of legal services. , . . A statement of an intention to commit a crime
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made in the course of seeking legal advice is protected by the
privilege, unless the crime-fraud exception applies.
That exception
applies only if the client or prospective client seeks advice or
assistance in furtherance of criminal conduct." Id. at 115. The court
went on to find that Tyree's communication to Purcell was privileged,
saying, "Unless the crime-fraud exception applies, the attorney-client
privilege should apply to communications concerning possible future, as
well as past, criminal conduct, because an informed lawyer may be able
to dissuade the client from improper future conduct and, if not, under
the ethical rules may elect in the public interest to make a limited
disclosure of the client's threatened conduct." Id. at 116.
Defendant also relies on Kleinfeld
v. State, 568 So.2d 937 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1990), which held that it was error to require an
attorney to testify about his client's statement: "They [the police]
know I did [murdered] Eric. I've got nothing to lose by doing you and
then turning the gun on myself" because the statement was privileged.
Id. at 939-40. However, Kleinfeld
was later distinguished in Florida by
Hodgson Russ,
which stated that Kleinfeld
applied only to cases where
a privileged communication was admitted to prove an admission to a
previous crime.
867 So.2d at 1248.
It did not apply when the
attorney's testimony would be admitted to prove that the client intended
to commit a future murder.
Id.
The Court finds Aviles
and Hodgson
Russ more persuasive than
Purcell
for a number of reasons. First, Aviles
seems more in line with
Utah's current recognition of attorney-client privilege. Specifically,
in Jackson
v. Kennecott
Copper Corp.,
27 Utah 2d 310, 315, 495 P. 2d 1254
(1972), the court, citing to U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery,
89 F.Supp.
357 (D. Mass. 1950), said that a party asserting privilege has the
burden of showing that the communication between attorney and client was
"for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or
(ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding."
Additionally, Utah Rule of Evidence 504(a)(6) provides: "A communication
is *confidential' if not intended to be disclosed to third persons other
than those to whom the disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of
professional legal services to the client or those reasonably necessary
for the transmission of the communication." Subsection (b) of Rule 504
goes on to say: "A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications
made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal
services
to the client between the client
and the
client's
representatives, lawyers . . . ." It is clear that Utah holds that not
everything a person says to his attorney is necessarily privileged. A'
person can make statements to his attorney which are not privileged
because they are not made for the purpose of facilitating legal
services. In the present case, Defendant did not make the threats to
his attorney for the "purpose of facilitating the rendition of
professional legal services." He did not seek legal advice, an opinion
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regarding his potential actions, etc.2 While Defendant was represented
by counsel when he made the alleged threats, his threats did not at all
relate to counsel's representation of him. Therefore, the statements
seem to fall under Jackson,
et. al., which would exclude them from
privilege.
Second, Aviles/Hodgson
Russ are the most recent efforts of courts
to resolve this issue and seem to represent a growing trend in favor of
finding threats unprotected by attorney/client privilege.
Finally, Aviles/Hodgson
represent a more compelling policy interest
than Purcell.
Purcell
argues that, in order to protect the
attorney/client privilege, all statements made to attorneys must be
afforded protections that they would not ordinarily be afforded.
Aviles/Hodgson
recognize
that
attorney/client
privilege
can be
adequately protected by affording maximum protection to statements that
are made in the context of the attorney/client relations, i.e.,
statements that are made to facilitate legal services.
However,
statements that are not made to facilitate legal services are not
properly protected under attorney/client privilege. This services the
interest of the attorney/client privilege while still supporting other
important policy considerations such as facilitating prosecution of
criminal behavior. •..•-,,
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Defendant's Motion
in Limine should be DENIED because the attorney-client privilege does
not bar Ms. Jelte from testifying at Def e n da nt'r serial.
SO ORDERED this

/ £ day of

Jujie^:20J).d'^
Vc

Judg^.^eph.^^ijf Henriod
District Court^nJudge

2

Strangely, if Defendant had sought legal advice in order to further his alleged intended crimes, his statements
would not be privileged according to Purcell. This could lead to the odd result that statements made in furtherance of
receiving advice would not be protected, while statements not made in furtherance of receiving advice would be
protected.
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